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Remix Without Romance
THOMAS W. JOo
A dominant argument in intellectual property scholarship asserts that technologies
such as digital copying empower individuals to participate in the making of culture. Such
participation involves individuals appropriating cultural material, "remixing " it with other
elements, and "recoding " it by assigning it alternative meanings. By enabling more people
to participate in culture, remixing and recoding supposedly enhance "semiotic democracy "
and mitigate the dominance of the media industry. The same theorists who make this
argument also tend to assert that copyright law is in need of significant reform because it
inhibits recoding and thus stifles semiotic democracy.
This Article challenges the empirical assertion that law inhibits recoding-but it also
questions the normative assumption that recoding is presumptively good for semiotic
democracy. This Article focuses on a specific type of recoding: musical sampling (that is,
the recoding of music through digital copying and other means). Sampling, particularly in
hip-hop music, is frequently cited as a paradigmatic example of recoding that has been
inhibited by intellectual property law. The legal history of sampling, however, suggests
otherwise. Commentators have misread important judicial opinions about sampling and
misunderstood the business practices of the music industry. At least in the sampling
context, law has not prevented the reallocation of recoding rights by contract.
While markets have been able to reallocate sampling rights, however, such
transactions do not necessarily advance semiotic democracy, because market failures afflict
the marketplace of ideas. In the cultural context, as in the political and economic contexts,
formally equal opportunity to participate does not result in equality of influence, and can in
fact exacerbate power imbalances. For example, legal and technological innovations (such
as digital copying and the Internet) can enable cultural underdogs to recode the messages
of media conglomerates and other dominant cultural institutions. But those same
innovations also allow dominant institutions to appropriate from the underdog-and
dominant institutions can then use their influence to "drown out" those independent voices
with recoded meanings. Moreover, recoding by its nature involves the incorporation and
repetition of dominant cultural messages. Such repetition can propagate and reinforce
dominant messages, resulting in the cooptation of recoding, regardless of the recoder's
intent. In short, recoding is not clearly conducive to semiotic democracy. Rather, it is full
of internal contradictions that make its relationship to semiotic democracy an ambivalent
one.
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I. INTRODUCTION: "RECODING" AND "SEMIOTIC DEMOCRACY"
In recent years, intellectual property theorists have advanced the
argument that the law should be designed to foster broad popular
participation in cultural production. Many adherents of this vision refer to
it as "semiotic democracy." Michael Madow, for example, applies the
term to refer to an aspirational "society in which all persons are free and
able to participate actively, if not equally, in the generation and circulation
of meanings and values."' William Fisher writes that individuals in such a
society "would be able to participate in the process of making cultural
meaning. Instead of being merely passive consumers of images and
artifacts produced by others, they would help shape the world of ideas and
symbols in which they live."2 According to Fisher, "[a]ctive engagement
of this sort would help both to sustain several of the features of the good
life-e.g., meaningful work and self-determination-and to foster cultural
diversity."
3
A significant roadblock to semiotic democracy is the fact that a
relatively small number of multinational media enterprises dominate the
channels of cultural distribution,4 such as television, publishing, and
recorded music. Many of these same enterprises also hold copyrights in
many influential cultural properties. A number of prominent legal scholars
argue that legal reform, including reducing the scope of copyright, can
mitigate this concentrated cultural influence enjoyed by the "culture
"Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law. Thanks to Angus Batey,
Mario Biagioli, Nancy Kim, Leslie Kurtz, Michal Shur-Ofry, Madhavi Sunder, and especially the late
Keith Aoki for their helpful comments on this paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented at
the UC Davis Intellectual Property and Innovation Colloquium, and I thank all the participants for their
insights. Thanks also to my research assistants, Wendy Motooka, Chris Ditico, and Khalil Mohseni,
and UC Davis law librarians Erin Murphy and Aaron Dailey. This article could not have been written
without financial support from the UC Davis School of Law and Dean Kevin Johnson. I would like to
dedicate this Article to the memory of Keith Aoki, an influential scholar and a wonderful colleague.
1 Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81
CALIF. L. REV. 125, 146 (1993).
2 William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 193 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 200 1).
3 William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1203,
1217-18 (1998) (footnote omitted).
4 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS tN A CONNECTED
WORLD 263 (2001).
industry., 5  Lawrence Lessig has loosely labeled this aspirational reform
"free culture." 6 According to this view, the public actively participates in
culture by appropriating these dominant cultural properties and "recoding"
them-that is, by challenging their proffered meanings and assigning new
ones.7  Digital copying technology and the Internet have made it possible
to "remix"8 and re-disseminate appropriated cultural materials with just a
point and a click.
Intellectual property law, however, empowers "owners" to prevent
many forms of appropriation. Most copyright scholars agree that this
power is inimical to semiotic democracy, and that reforming the law9 to
facilitate cultural recoding will advance semiotic democracy.'0  For
example, Rosemary Coombe, perhaps the first to use the term "semiotic
democracy" in the context of intellectual property law, argued that
excessive intellectual property protections interfere with a "quintessentially
human" quality: "the capacity to make meaning, challenge meaning, and
transform meaning. . . ."' According to Michael Madow, the law should
encourage recoding in order to "align itself with cultural pluralism and
popular cultural production."12  This Article questions this emerging
orthodoxy. Cultural innovation and participation can reach
accommodation with intellectual property law and even benefit from it.
Furthermore, the liberalization of appropriation rights may have harmful
5 The term "culture industry" refers to the mass commercial production of arts and entertainment
that began in the late nineteenth century. The so-called Frankfurt School of cultural criticism coined
the term in the 1930s. See Madow, supra note 1, at 129 n.8.
6 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004). Lessig argues for less legal regulation of
the "ways... ordinary individuals share[] and transform[] their culture." Id. at 8.
7 See Rosemary J. Coombe, Colloquy, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual
Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1863-64 (1991).
8 "A remix (or mash-up) is a work created from one or more preexisting works-such as music,
photos, videos, computer games, etc." Robert P. Merges, Copyright, Creativity, Catalogs: Locke
Remixed ;-), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1259, 1259 (2007); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING
ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY 69 (2008); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 257, 263 (2006) (describing a "'Participation Age' of remix culture, blogs, podcasts, wikis, and
peer-to-peer filesharing" that "views intellectual properties as the raw materials for its own creative
acts").
9 The pioneering legal scholarship on semiotic democracy applied the concept to trademark and
the right of publicity, as well as to copyright. See, e.g., Madow, supra note 1 (addressing publicity).
1°See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 4-5 (2001) (arguing that
intellectual property law unnecessarily protects works already in existence at the expense of limiting
future works); Olufumnilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright
and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 630 (2006) (advocating borrowing as a norm of musical
practice that should be protected by copyright law); Fisher, supra note 2, at 168 (providing a survey of
intellectual property theories); Fisher HI, supra note 3, at 1203 (arguing for laws designed to facilitate
and reinforce the shift from intellectual property laws to contractual rights by creators of intellectual
products suitable for distribution over the internet).
1 Coombe, supra note 7, at 1879 (footnote omitted).
12 Madow, supra note 1, at 239.
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effects on semiotic democracy as well as beneficial ones.
This Article focuses on a form of recoding and remixing widely
celebrated by intellectual property scholars: the incorporation of
copyrighted musical compositions and/or recordings into new musical
works through means such as digital sampling. This type of appropriation,
which this Article refers to generally as "sampling," is the basis of
countless pieces of popular music, and is closely identified with the hip-
hop (or rap)' 3 genre that has become a dominant force in popular culture
worldwide. The hip-hop era has coincided with the digital age, and hip-
hop has become closely identified with recoding and particularly digital
remixing. Indeed, the term "remix," which today is often used to refer to
recoding practices in general, derives from pop music, where it has been
used for decades to refer more narrowly to re-edited versions of records in
hip-hop, disco, and other genres.' 4 Pop records are typically produced by
"mixing" together multiple separately recorded elements (i.e., the vocals
and the various instruments). The term "remix" originated to describe an
alternative version of a record (typically a more danceable version intended
for nightclubs) made up of those constituent recorded elements
reassembled in a different way and combined with additional elements.15
As noted above, "free culture" scholars insist that copyright laws that
burden recoding are inherently harmful to individual expressive freedom,
and that lifting such laws will necessarily increase semiotic democracy.
This thinking has influenced two important assertions that "free culture"
theorists tend to make about hip-hop and sampling. First, most scholars
writing in the area assert that copyright law has been destructive of
recoding in hip-hop music and thus of semiotic democracy.' 6  Second,
most "free culture" scholars further believe that a legal regime that is more
permissive of cultural appropriation, such as sampling, will necessarily
13 The term "rap" more precisely refers to hip-hop music that incorporates spoken, or "rapped,"
vocals, but the terms tend to be used interchangeably.
14 See The Remixmasters: A History Lesson for Puffy Combs, SLATE.COM, http://www.slate.com/
articles/arts/music box/2002/07/theremixmasters.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
15 This practice typically did not implicate copyright disputes. In the pre-digital age, creating
such remixes required obtaining the master tapes, which could only be done with the cooperation of the
record company that owned and possessed the tapes. See, e.g., Andy Kellerman, Tom Moulton,
ALLMUSIC.COM, http://www.allmusic.com/artist/p107949/biography (describing how Tom Moulton
produced one of the first American remix records in the 1970s after a record company executive
"handed Moulton a copy of the master [tapes] for Don Downing's 'Dream World,' a song that had
already been issued as a single"). By the time American record producers began experimenting with
remixes, Jamaican DJs of the 1960s had already pioneered the practice, which they called "dub." See
JEFF CHANG, CAN'T STOP, WON'T STOP: A HISTORY OF THE Hip-HOP GENERATION 29-30 (2005).6Ssee, e.g., VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 143-44; Arewa, supra note 10, at 630 ("[T]he
question of whether and how sampling should be permitted is in some measure an inquiry about how
and to what extent hip hop can and should continue to exist as a musical form.").
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contribute to greater semiotic democracy. 17 But these arguments paint an
excessively romantic picture of recoding and remixing as victims of legal
persecution and symbols of democracy.
With respect to the first assertion, many intellectual property scholars
argue that after a long tradition of benignly neglecting recoding, copyright
law shifted direction in recent decades to inhibit appropriation generally
and sampling specifically.1 8  The historical record refutes this claim,
however. Legal scholars, perhaps understandably, have overemphasized
the influence of law and underestimated the ability of artistic and business
communities to adapt to it. Sampling and its predecessor forms of musical
recoding developed in the presence of copyright law and reached
accommodation with it-even in the absence of judicial decisions. By the
time courts explicitly stated that sampling requires copyright clearance,
they were not imposing new rules on the music industry, but only
confirming practices that the music business had been following since the
earliest days of recorded hip-hop--and even before.
This Article next challenges the second, more normative assertion-
that actively facilitating recoding would further semiotic democracy.
While this Article argues that recoding can flourish despite copyright law,
it is skeptical of recoding's supposed benefits to semiotic democracy.
Intellectual property scholars insist that recoding furthers semiotic
democracy (and copyright law harms it) because they view recoding solely
as an autonomous act of individual expression. This position is consistent
with liberal pluralism's analytical focus on the individual actor, as well as
its descriptive and normative commitment to individual autonomy,
particularly to formally equal freedom to engage in speech and other forms
of expression. Under this view, the absence of legal constraint is both
necessary and sufficient to empower individuals to overcome domination
and achieve self-realization. Thus, formally equal rights to participate in
cultural and political dialogue-such as a right to recode via remixing-are
the necessary and sufficient response to the concentration of cultural
influence. For example, although antitrust law has permitted the current
concentration of media power that concerns so many intellectual property
commentators, Lawrence Lessig has argued that increased expressive
opportunities (such as Internet access and the right to use copyrighted
materials) are sufficient to counteract media concentration and that reform
17 See, e.g., VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 138 ("Digital sampling also had a powerful
democratizing effect on American popular music."); Arewa, supra note 10, at 630 (advocating
borrowing as a norm of musical practice that should be protected under copyright law).
18 See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 148
(2008) (stating that sampling decreased dramatically as licenses were required for all musical
segments); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 141-44 (asserting that copyright case law increased the
cost of sampling and had a stifling effect on creativity in rap music).
[Vol. 44:415
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of antitrust policy is unnecessary.' 9
But the liberal foundation of "free culture" theory is a historical irony,
for the concepts of "recoding" and "semiotic democracy" actually
originated as critiques of liberal pluralism. The originators of these
theories argued that recoding has an ambivalent-if not complicit-
relationship to structures of domination. They saw the power of cultural
establishments, such as the concentrated entertainment industry, as
structurally embedded and durable. Under this view, formally equal
opportunity to create alternative meanings is insufficient to correct
substantive inequalities in cultural influence. The version of "semiotic
democracy" theory in today's legal academy fails to address, or even to
meaningfully engage, this central insight of the original theory. Yet this
argument is even more compelling today in view of the highly
concentrated nature of the culture industry. Although the Internet and
other digital technologies offer new opportunities for individual
participation, established forms of media maintain their dominance.2 °
Furthermore, new technologies offer new opportunities to media
conglomerates as well as to individuals.
The remainder of this Article develops the foregoing arguments as
follows. Part II is primarily concerned with the first argument-that
scholars overstate the destructive effect of copyright law. Part II provides
a brief legal history of musical appropriation in hip-hop music. Intellectual
property commentators writing in the "free culture" vein insist that the
21
essence of hip-hop is copying, and that it thus exists in opposition to
mainstream culture and norms of intellectual property.2 2 But the historical
record shows that long before the hip-hop era, recoding practices in the
pop music industry developed in concert with copyright law. Despite the
absence of judicial decisions, the industry developed norms of obtaining
copyright permission and setting permission fees by contract. When hip-
19 See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 110. Lessig is, of course, a pioneer of the insight that technology,
as well as law, enables the dominant position of the culture industries. For example, he has identified
encryption technology as a threat to creativity. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 6, at 156-57. His policy
analysis of encryption, like his views on antitrust, reflect his confidence in formal equality. Ultimately,
his complaint is not with encryption technology per se, but laws (such as the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act) that prevent the circumvention of encryption. Id. at 157. This position implies that
enabling competition between hackers and industry would be sufficient to overcome the negative
effects of encryption.
20 According to a survey conducted in 2011 by the ANA (Association of National Advertisers),
"Television is still the top media platform for advertisers.... 64 percent of [business-to-consumer]
marketers reported that their television budget has increased over the past two years." TV Is Still the
Top Media Choice for Advertisers (Press Release by Association of National Advertisers), States News
Service, Oct. 24, 2011, available at http://www.ana.net/content/show/id/22187.
21 See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 9 (asserting that rap music is built upon "ripping" and
"sampling... the music of others").
22 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 133 (asserting a clash between the hip-hop tradition of
sampling and American copyright law).
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hop came on the scene, the same norms applied; neither artists nor record
companies saw it as fundamentally different from prior recoding practices.
Hip-hop generally, and sampling techniques specifically, have developed
despite, and perhaps even because of, intellectual property law.
Copyright scholars are in general agreement that a 1991 opinion,
Grand Upright Music v. Warner Bros. Records,23 suddenly and radically
changed the legal status of sampling by declaring that sampling without
copyright permission constitutes infringement. This general understanding
is, in fact, a gross misconception of the opinion. Grand Upright did not
even present the question of whether unlicensed sampling would constitute
infringement, because the defendants conceded that it would.24 Indeed, the
historical record, including the court records in Grand Upright itself,
shows that the hip-hop community, from its earliest days, generally
understood and respected the obligation to obtain and pay for permission to
use samples in commercial recordings.
Part III of this Article focuses on the second argument-that recoding
has an ambivalent relationship to semiotic democracy. Even assuming
copyright law discourages cultural appropriation, that would not
necessarily harm semiotic democracy. Increased appropriation can have
negative as well as positive effects on the dispersion of semiotic influence.
Because it enables the recoding of cultural products, a legal regime that
facilitates appropriation can disperse the power to make meanings-what
this Article will refer to as "semiotic power." But it can also encourage
activity that contributes to the concentration of semiotic power-that is, it
can have the very "constraining" effect on cultural dialogue that Coombe
deplores.
Indeed, exercising a "right" to recode may empower dominant culture
as well as challenge it. Not all borrowing of cultural products constitutes
autonomous meaning-making by individuals. For example, permitting
recoding without copyright permission enables individuals to freely
appropriate from the powerful culture industries, but it also enables
appropriation in the reverse direction. Furthermore, individuals who
recode may assign new meanings to dominant cultural products, but they
cannot easily displace the existing meanings. Thus recoding re-
disseminates those existing meanings and reaffirms their importance.
Those who borrow from the culture industries, even to criticize them,
engage in a discourse on terms set by the culture industry.25 By selecting
23 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
24 See infra, Section II.A.3. The case was actually about whether the plaintiffs had proven
ownership of the relevant copyrights and whether the defendant samplers had tried in good faith to
obtain permission. See id.
25 Cf Stuart Hall, Notes on Deconstructing "The Popular", in PEOPLE'S HISTORY AND SOCIALIST
THEORY 227, 233 (Raphael Samuel ed., 1981) ("[T]he cultural industries do have the power ... by
[Vol. 44:415
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from and further repeating the cultural materials preselected by the culture
industry, recoding can simultaneously undermine and further concentrate
the cultural influence of the already dominant culture industry. For
example, sampling existing popular music and incorporating it into new
hip-hop music is sometimes described as a challenge to dominant musical
culture and the music industry, 26 but sampling also re-disseminates existing
music and extends its cultural influence.
Liberal legal theory tends to have difficulty with this kind of internal
contradiction. Indeed, intellectual property scholars tend to see a dualistic,
if not Manichaean, struggle between oppressive laws on the one hand and
autonomous recoding on the other.27 The tension between domination and
autonomy, however, expresses itself not solely between copyright law and
recoding, but also within copyright law and within recoding.
II. LEGAL DOMINATION?
A. Business Practice and the Limits ofLegal Domination
The narrative of a battle between copyright and hip-hop is an
overdramatized myth that ignores the actual history of the interaction
between law and musical recoding. Art (and the business of art) can reach
accommodation with the law; indeed it has done so, allowing art to flourish
in harmony with the law. In fact, the tension between legal restrictions and
creative energy can be a productive one. After all, copyright law does not
constitute a prohibition on cultural appropriation. It merely assigns it a
price-just as every aspect of artistic production, from guitars to
paintbrushes, has a price.28  Sampling in hip-hop, like earlier kinds of
repetition and selection, to impose and implant such definitions of ourselves as fit more easily the
descriptions of the dominant or preferred culture.").
26 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 137 ("[S]ampling... can be a political act-a way of
crossing the system .... ").
27 Michael Madow, for example, argues that deciding whether to protect the right of publicity
"requires us to make a fundamental choice... between centralized, top-down management of popular
culture on the one hand, and a more decentralized, open, 'democratic' cultural practice on the other."
Madow, supra note 1, at 239.
28 Opponents of strong copyright protection typically argue that intellectual property is different
from these kinds of goods because intellectual property is "nonrivalrous." In other words, as one
leading commentator put it, "my use of an idea does not impose any direct cost on you .... Precisely
because its consumption is nonrivalrous, information does not present any risk of the tragedy of the
commons. It simply cannot be 'used up."' Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free
Riding, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1031, 1050-51 (2005). But your copying of my intellectual property, such as
my music, can impose direct costs on me and "use up" its economic value. The most obvious example
is if you manufacture and sell unauthorized copies that displace my own sales. The "nonrivalrous
good" argument depends on question-begging as well. For example, the assertion that you should be
able to freely sample my music because doing so "does not impose any direct cost" on me only makes
sense if you assume that I do not have the exclusive right to exploit my work. (To be fair, the assertion
2011]
musical borrowing, did not develop in some mythical golden age in which
intellectual property was unregulated. Rather, it (and its many
antecedents) developed within a copyright regime fundamentally like
today's.
The slow pace of the law means that it tends to lag behind artistic
innovation rather than run ahead of it. This tends to limit the law's role to
settling disputes over the proceeds from established practices. It simply
arrives too late to prevent new methods of making meanings. In the
meantime, art and business can develop a balance between new practice
and existing law. One influential commentator argues that sampling in
hip-hop "revealed gaping flaws in the premises of how copyright law gets
applied to music .... ,29 But in fact, there were no such "gaping flaws."
Musical recoding thrived, copyright law notwithstanding, long before the
advent of hip-hop. Neither courts nor the music industry found sampling
in hip-hop to be significantly different from existing forms of recoding,
and thus it caused no legal upheaval.
1. Public Performance and the Birth offHip-hop
Law in the United States has regulated the appropriation of
copyrighted music at least since the early twentieth century, but these
burdens have not prevented the development of recoding practices in hip-
hop or in other musical genres. For example, since the Copyright Act of
1909, copyright in a musical composition has included the exclusive right
to control "public performance for profit" of the work.30 Nonetheless, the
earliest hip-hop music involved disc jockeys ("DJs") publicly playing and
recoding copyrighted recorded music at for-profit dance parties.3 ' DJ Kool
Herc (Clive Campbell)'s 1973 DJ show has become a "creation myth" of
hip-hop.32 He is credited with inventing the practice of manipulating vinyl
records to repeatedly play partygoers' favorite portions of a song.33
Similar turntable manipulation allowed the creation of collage-like mixes
made up of portions of multiple records.34 Other DJs created the technique
of moving a record under the needle to distort the recording into rhythmic
that sampling requires my permission because it does impose a direct cost on me is just as circular, as it
depends on the assumption that I do have such rights.)
29 VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 133.
'o Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § l(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076, repealed by Copyright
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006)).
31 Furthermore, music was only one part of "hip-hop," a subculture that also involved dance and
graffiti-activities which did not attract the attention of copyright law, probably because they never
came to implicate the amount of money involved in commercial recordings. See THE ANTHOLOGY OF
RAP 2-4 (Adam Bradley & Andrew DuBois eds., 2010) (discussing DJ Kool Herc's influence on the
origin of rap music, and the surrounding culture that emerged).
32 CHANG, supra note 15, at 67.
" Id. at 78-79.
34 Tricia Rose, Rap Music, in THE HiP HOP READER 17, 17 (Tim Strode & Tim Wood eds., 2008).
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"scratching" sounds.35 The use of records and turntables as musical
instruments is sometimes considered its own subgenre of hip-hop, now
sometimes referred to as "turntablism. ''36 While the DJ played records, a
master of ceremonies ("MC") would sometimes use the microphone to
encourage dancers; this practice is one of the forerunners of rap.37
Copyright law entitled the owners of recorded compositions to control
DJs' public performances of the records. Yet this rule did not inhibit
semiotic democracy as expressed through the grass-roots innovations of
DJs.38 Copyright law notwithstanding, live hip-hop became a vibrant and
influential musical form in the 1970s. 39
2. Reproduction, Derivative Works, and Hip-hop Recordings
The incorporation of copyrighted music into a new recording (through
sampling, for example) does not involve public performance, but it
implicates different intellectual property rights-the rights of a copyright
holder to control reproductions and derivative works. The holder of
copyright in a musical composition has enjoyed the exclusive right to
"publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work," as well as "to arrange or
adapt it" at least since the Copyright Act of 1909.40 For at least a century,
then, the copyright in a musical composition has included a right to control
recordings that recode the composition. The Copyright Act of 1976, the
backbone of the current copyright code, reaffirmed the copyright owner's
exclusive right to "adapt" under the rubric of the exclusive right "to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work."4'
3s See CHANG, supra note 15, at 114 (describing the advent of the scratch).
36 See, turntablism: beat juggling & scratching, TURNTABLISM.COM, http://tumtablism.com.au/
(last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
37 See CHANG, supra note 15, at 78; Rose, supra note 34, at 20-21.
38 The extent to which copyright holders actually asserted this right is unclear. So-called
"performing-rights agencies" such as ASCAP and BMI typically collect public-performance royalties
from performance venues on behalf of copyright holders. Collecting performance rights royalties from
smaller venues has long been notoriously difficult, as it involves painstaking fieldwork and resistant
venue owners. John Bowe, The Copyright Enforcers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 6,2010, at 38.
39 See CHANG, supra note 15, at 151, 168 (describing the influence of hip-hop on New York's art
and punk cultures).
40 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§ l(a), 1(b), 35 Stat. 1175, repealed by Copyright
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006)).
41 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §106, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 106). A derivative work is
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of...
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a
"derivative work."
2011]
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A recording of a composition implicates both the copyright in the
composition and a separate copyright in the recording itself. Sound
recordings first became copyrightable in 1972, around the time of the
advent of hip-hop.42  The rights associated with copyright in a sound
recording, however, differ somewhat from those associated with copyright
in a composition. Under the 1976 Act, the owner of the copyright in a
sound recording has exclusive rights over reproduction and derivative
works, but these rights extend only to use of the actual sounds captured on
the recording.43  Thus, an unauthorized recording of a similar-sounding
new performance does not infringe upon the copyright in a sound
recording (though it might infringe the copyright in the underlying
composition). As this Article will show, hip-hop records have both used
sound-alike performances and taken the actual sounds from recordings
(through the recording of DJ performances, tape manipulations, and digital
sampling). Despite their technical and legal differences, these are all
appropriations that potentially infringe upon copyrights. Thus, for
convenience, this Article will refer to all of these methods of borrowing as
"sampling."
As with recoding in public performances, then, copyright law puts
burdens on recorded musical recodings. Yet the law did not prevent the
rise of such recordings. For example, long before the hip-hop era, Chuck
Berry's publisher threatened to sue the Beach Boys for copying the melody
of his 1958 composition "Sweet Little Sixteen" in their 1963 song "Surfin'
USA." This resulted in an out-of-court settlement (and writing credit for
Berry).44
Technological appropriations from sound recordings-and legal
responses thereto-also predate hip-hop. Beginning with the 1956 hit
"The Flying Saucer," Bill Buchanan and Dickie Goodman produced a long
series of novelty comedy records that included dialogue assembled from
snippets of pop hits. They were sued by multiple music publishers who
alleged infringement of the copyrights in the underlying compositions.
The parties reached an out-of-court settlement that entitled the publishers
to royalties.45 Goodman continued to make these collage-like records for
Id. § 101.
42 David Dante Troutt, I Own, Therefore I Am: Copyright, Personality, and Soul Music in the
Digital Commons, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 373, 375 (2010) (citing Act of Oct.
15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 5, 19, 20, 26, 101)).
The copyright in a sound recording, however, did not, and still does not, confer any right to control
public performance of the recording. See id. at 422-23 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 114(a)). Thus, unlike the
owners of compositions (typically music-publishing companies), the owners of sound-recording
copyrights (typically record labels) have no right to control DJ performances.
41 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
" PHILIP LAMBERT, INSIDE THE MUSIC OF BRIAN WILSON 11,64 (2007).45 See Chuck Miller, Dickie Goodman: We've Spotted the Shark Again, CHUCKTHEWRITER.COM,
http://www.chuckthewriter.com/goodman.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2011) (originally published in a
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decades; indeed, he had a Top Ten hit during the formative years of hip-
hop with his 1975 solo record, "Mr. Jaws., 4 6  The influential hip-hop
producer Steinski (Steve Stein) cites Buchanan and Goodman as direct
influences on the sampling techniques of hip-hop.47
The long history of copyright owners' control of reproduction and
derivative works did not prevent the development of recordings based on
appropriation. Rather, it simply led to a business practice of paying for
permission to recode copyrighted compositions, just as an artist would pay
other contributors to a recording, such as studio musicians or recording
engineers. Whether this was a doctrinally correct interpretation of
copyright law is open to debate. As many commentators argue today,
musical appropriations that involve significant recoding may fall under the
"fair use" exception to copyright protection, a doctrine that dates at least
back to 1869.48 But right or wrong as a doctrinal matter, copyright
holders' insistence on payment did not prevent the use of recoding in pop
records. The later development of sampling in recorded hip-hop is, as
Steinski recognizes, merely a continuation of an established artistic
practice. Both turntablism and rap music made the transition from live
performance to records, and the existing business practice of paying for
permission to appropriate was, quietly and unremarkably, extended to hip-
hop records. Indeed, the practice dates to the very first commercially
successful hip-hop record-yet it did not prevent hip-hop from becoming a
dominant artistic and commercial force in popular music.
In 1979, Sugarhill Records released "Rapper's Delight" by the
Sugarhill Gang, the first hip-hop single to become a national hit.49  It
featured rappers backed by studio musicians recreating the distinctive
instrumental portion of "Good Times," a contemporaneous hit song by the
group Chic. 50  (This sub-category of songs--consisting of a rap vocal
backed by a recognizable, previously copyrighted tune-will be referred to
as "hybrids.") Soon after the release of "Rapper's Delight," the composers
of "Good Times," Nile Rodgers and Bernard Edwards, threatened to sue
Sugarhill for infringing upon their copyrighted composition.5' The parties
1997 edition of Goldmine Magazine). They were separately sued by record labels for "unfair
competition," on the ground that their recordings used the services of performers who were under
exclusive contract to the record labels. See Modern Joins in Luniverse Suit; Quick Action Skedded,
BILLBOARD, Nov. 17, 1956, at 16, 30. At the time (prior to 1972), the record labels had no intellectual
property rights in the sound recordings.
46 JOEL WHITBURN, THE BILLBOARD BOOK OF TOP 40 HITs 260 (8th ed. 2004).
47 JOSEPH SCHLOSS, MAKING BEATS: THE ART OF SAMPLE-BASED Hip-HOP 19-20 (2004).
48 See Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 40 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869). Fair use is now codified at 17
U.S.C. § 107.
49 See Steven Daly, Hip Hop Happens, VANITY FAIR, Nov. 2005, at 250.
50 Id. Sugarhill's house band had reproduced Chic's "Good Times" on the record, yet initial
pressings only credited producer Sylvia Robinson and the Sugarhill Gang with authorship. Id.
51 Id.
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reached an out-of-court settlement,52 and Rodgers and Edwards are now
included as co-writers of "Rapper's Delight" 53 (and, presumably, receive a
share of the considerable profits from the song). The story of "Rapper's
Delight" shows that copyright holders successfully asserted a right to
control sampling from the very dawn of recorded hip-hop. The settlement
was consistent with established practices in the music business, and it did
not inhibit the birth of recorded hip-hop or its subsequent development.
In 1980, shortly after "Rapper's Delight," Sugarhill Records released
the first commercial recording of tumtablism, "The Adventures of
Grandmaster Flash on the Wheels of Steel. 54  The song featured the
celebrated DJ, Grandmaster Flash, manipulating a number of easily
recognizable recent hit records (including, once again, "Good Times").
Like the Buchanan and Goodman records, "The Adventures of
Grandmaster Flash" likely implicated the copyrights of multiple
composers. "The Adventures of Grandmaster Flash" further involved the
relatively new copyrights in sound recordings. The existence of copyright
law, and recent experience with litigious composers, however, did not
prevent the release of the record.
3. Evidence of Business Practice: The Misunderstood Case of Grand
Upright
Obtaining sample clearance appears to have long been standard
practice in the recording industry. Legal commentators' reaction to Grand
Upright Music v. Warner Bros. Records,55 a 1991 federal district court
case, is emblematic of their tendency to overstate copyright's inhibiting
influence on recoding. Grand Upright enjoined the sale of a hip-hop
album that used an unauthorized sample from a pop single.56 Intellectual
property commentators assert, without foundation, that the case gave
copyright owners new rights against samplers and thus suddenly imposed
new, burdensome licensing costs on recoding. 57  This is manifestly
incorrect. The preceding discussion shows that samplers paid for
copyright permission from the beginning of recorded hip-hop.58 By the
52 Id.
53 id.
54 See THE ANTHOLOGY OF RAP, supra note 27, at 10.
55 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
56 
Id. at 185.
57 See, e.g., KEMBREW McLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 67-68 (2005) (asserting that digital
sampling in the late 1980s "was a sort of Wild West" of "free experimentation" that suddenly ended
due to Grand Upright); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 140-41 (claiming that before Grand
Upright, "no one knew what the guidelines for digital sampling were," and "the industry was waiting
for a court to weigh in").
58 Similarly, a widely-cited student note recently argued that copyright law endangers jazz music
today because it requires musicians to pay for permission to record jazz versions of existing
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time of Grand Upright, sample clearance was a firmly established artistic
and business norm: indeed, closer inspection of Grand Upright itself
verifies this.
Double Dee and Steinski's 1983 song, "Lesson 1-The Payoff Mix,"
was made by splicing together analog tapes of scores of copyrighted
sources. 59 It has become an important influence on hip-hop production, but
according to Steinski, it was never released commercially due to concerns
about the cost of clearances.60 This indicates an understanding among the
earliest hip-hop samplers that they were obliged to pay for copyright
permission. Although legal concerns prevented commercial release of that
particular work, "Lesson 1" was nonetheless made and, moreover,
achieved cultural importance. "Lesson 1" became highly influential on
later hip-hop and paved the way for Steinski to become a successful hip-
hop producer and recording artist.
61
MC Hammer, who used the tune from Rick James's "Super Freak" in
his immense 1990 hit "U Can't Touch This," acknowledged an obligation
to pay James for copyright permission: "I didn't need a lawyer to tell me
that . . . I'm borrowing enough of his song that he deserves to be
compensated., 62 The 1991 rap single "Pop Goes the Weasel," by 3rd Bass,
reflects a similar view of copyright: the song uses samples itself, but the
lyrics mock a rapper who fails to give credit for samples and gets sued.63
This is an apparent reference to Vanilla Ice,64 who was accused of using an
unauthorized sample of the Queen and David Bowie song "Under
Pressure" in his 1990 hit, "Ice Ice Baby." Notably, Vanilla Ice did not
assert the argument, fashionable today, that he should be legally entitled to
sample without permission. Rather, he insisted that the passage in his song
was slightly different from "Under Pressure"-for which he was widely
ridiculed.65 By 1991, he had entered into a settlement that reportedly cost
compositions. See Note, Jazz Has Got Copyright Law and That Ain't Good, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1940,
1944 (2005). Copyright law, however, has imposed this cost since the earliest days ofjazz.
59 See WNYC Soundcheck, Steinski Gives a Sampling History Lesson, NPR Music (Oct. 22,
2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=93844583.60 ld.
61 id.
62 Note, A New Spin on Music Sampling: A Case for Fair Pay, 105 HARv. L. REV. 726, 726
(1992) [hereinafter New Spin] (quoting Peter Castro, Chatter, PEOPLE WKLY., July 30, 1990, at 86).
63 3RD BASS, Pop Goes the Weasel, on DERELICTS OF DIALECT (Def Jam/Columbia 1991). The
lyrics are available at 3rd Bass-Pop Goes the Weasel Lyrics, SONGLYRICS,
http://www.songlyrics.com/3rd-bass/pop-goes-the-weasel-lyrics/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
6 The music video accompanying "Pop Goes the Weasel" portrays the members of 3rd Bass
beating up an actor dressed as Vanilla Ice. 3rd Bass-Pop Goes The Weasel (High Quality),
YoUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kqGXM23WUbs (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
65 Michael J. Mooney, For Us, Rob Van Winkle Will Always be Vanilla Ice, MIAMI NEW TIMES,
Nov. 26, 2009 ("He defended his beat in an infamous video clip--'Theirs goes ding-ding-ding dada
ding-ding, and mine goes ding-ding-ding dada ding-ding dink .... '").
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him four million dollars.66
According to a student author who interviewed music lawyers and
record company executives shortly before the Grand Upright decision:
Prudent music lawyers advise their artists to keep track of
samples included in their music and then seek out the
copyright holders to bargain for the right to use the
sample. After determining the cost of a prospective
license, a record executive or producer weighs that cost
against the potential success of the new work embodying
the sample.67
There is considerable support for this view, including the facts of the
widely misunderstood Grand Upright case itself. Extensive and
uncontroverted testimony in the case indicates that before the case was
decided, it was established and understood practice for hip-hop artists to
request and pay for copyright permission for samples.
Grand Upright involved the song "Alone Again," by the rapper Biz
Markie. The instrumental element of the song is constructed from a
sample from "Alone Again (Naturally)," a 1972 pop record written and
performed by Raymond "Gilbert" O'Sullivan. O'Sullivan was the
principal shareholder of the plaintiff corporation, Grand Upright Music,
Limited, which claimed ownership of copyrights in the sound recording
and the composition. The opening eight bars of the O'Sullivan recording,
or "about 30 seconds," are sampled and looped (i.e., repeated) to form the
instrumental basis for the entire length of the song.68 In addition, Biz
Markie sings a version of the title phrase.69  The song appeared on Biz
Markie's album I Need a Haircut, produced by an independent record
label, Cold Chillin', released by Warner Brothers Records, and distributed
by Warner's subsidiary, WEA.70 Markie, Cold Chillin', Warner, and WEA
66 id.
67 New Spin, supra note 62, at 727-28 (footnotes omitted). But see BOYLE, supra note 14, at 148
(asserting that seeking sample clearance was rare prior to Grand Upright).
68 See Transcript of Nov. 25, 1991 Hearing at 13, Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros.
Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (No. 91 Civ. 7648 (KTD)) [hereinafter Nov. 25
Hearing] (testimony of Raymond "Gilbert" O'Sullivan). The court records in Grand Upright are stored
at the National Archives Records Center, Lee's Summit, Missouri, Accession/transfer no. 021-93-0007,
Box no. 182, Location no. B4207072. A copy is on file with the author.
69 The song can be heard online in various places, including the UCLA and Columbia Law School
Copyright Infringement Project website, http://cip.law.ucla.edu/cases/1990-
1999/Pages/granduprightwamer.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
70 See Deposition of Leonard Fichtelberg at 4-7, Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. 182 (No. 91 Civ.
7648) [hereinafter Fichtelberg Deposition] (explaining the relationship between Cold Chillin' and
Warner Brothers); Deposition of George Rossi at 4-5, Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. 182 (No. 91 Civ.
7648) (explaining WEA's relationship to Warner Brothers).
[Vol. 44:415
REMIX WITHOUT ROMANCE
were all named defendants.
The Grand Upright court stated that the defendants "admit" to
unlicensed use of the sound recording and the composition. 71 The court
reasoned that the only remaining issue was whether Grand Upright owned
the copyrights.72 Based on this cursory discussion of infringement, the
opinion is widely misinterpreted as holding, without explanation, that
unauthorized sampling categorically constitutes copyright infringement.73
In fact, the court made no such holding, conclusory or otherwise.
Commentators have uniformly overlooked the fact (not readily apparent
from the opinion alone) that the case did not even present the legal
question of whether Biz Markie's sample, or sampling generally,
constituted infringement.
The record of the case shows that the defendants did not merely
"admit" to having sampled without permission; they conceded that
unauthorized sampling is illegal.74  The defendants-a rapper, an
independent hip-hop label, and a multinational major label-unequivocally
agreed that the sample at issue required copyright clearance, and that they
had used the sample in question without permission. The lawyer
representing all of the defendants75 stated in court: "We acknowledge that
we do not have the right to [use the sample without clearance;] we
acknowledge that at some point we are going to have to pay the copyright
proprietor., 76  The Grand Upright court did not "hold" that the
unauthorized sample (or any unauthorized sample) was infringing; that was
accepted by all parties for purposes of the case. In any event, the opinion
merely granted a preliminary injunction,77 and thus did not purport to be a
final disposition on the merits of any issue.78
The defense's primary argument had been that Grand Upright had
failed to prove it was the copyright owner of either O'Sullivan's
71 Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183.
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647, 650 n.14 (6th Cir. 2004)
(order granting panel rehearing) (criticizing the Grand Upright opinion for failing to show adequate
analysis); BOYLE, supra note 18, at 148 (condemning the Grand Upright opinion as "poor, "overly
broad," and "judicially inappropriate"); MCLEOD, supra note 48, at 78-79 (criticizing the Grand
Upright judge); Arewa, supra note 10, at 580 ("The court did not analyze why the sample was
infringement under applicable copyright law standards.").
74 See Transcript of Nov. 26, 1991 Hearing at 148, Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. 182 (No. 91 Civ.
7648) [hereinafter Nov. 26 Hearing].
" See Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183 (identifying Robert W. Cinque, of Cinque & Cinque,
P.C., as counsel for defendants).
76 Nov. 26 Hearing, supra note 74, at 148.
77 Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183, 185.
78 Shortly after the reported opinion granted the preliminary injunction, the parties (presumably
having reached a settlement) agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice. Stipulation and Order of
Dismissal [sic] with Prejudice, Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. 182 (No. 91 Civ. 7648).
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composition or the sound recording of it.7 9 The defendants' other line of
argument was that even if Grand Upright owned the copyrights, the
defendants' release of the album prior to obtaining clearance constituted
good faith conduct and thus an injunction would be an excessive remedy.
They claimed that they were in discussions with Grand Upright at the time
of release, and that it was common industry practice to release music
during clearance negotiations and finalize terms later.80  The president of
Cold Chillin' Records, as well as a copyright administrator and a music-
publishing executive with no involvement in the dispute, testified to this
practice. 81 The administrator further stated she had never refused a request
for clearance.82 Notably, neither of the defendants' two arguments asserted
a right to sample without permission; indeed, the latter theory
acknowledged an infringement, and claimed only that it was a minor and
non-willful violation.
Despite the evidence that the industry generally tolerated releases
during negotiations, other evidence suggested that at the time the album
was released, the defendants knew that Grand Upright would not grant
permission. 3 Thus the judge dismissed the "good faith" argument in a
79 See Defendants' Post-Hearing Memorandum on Plaintiff's Application for Preliminary
Injunction at 3-13, Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. 182 (No. 91 Civ. 7648) [hereinafter Post-Hearing
Memorandum] (arguing that Grand Upright had not proven ownership of the copyright to the
composition "Alone Again (Naturally)"); id. at 14-15 (arguing the same with respect to ownership of
the copyright to the sound recording). Although the Sixth Circuit has criticized Grand Upright for
failing to distinguish between the composition copyright and the sound recording copyright, see
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647, 650 n.14 (6th Cir. 2004), this is another
unfounded criticism. Grand Upright clearly states that it involves both the copyright to the "song" and
"the master recording thereof." 780 F. Supp. at 183. In any event, the distinction was unimportant
because the case involved a preliminary injunction application by the owner of both copyrights.
go See Nov. 26 Hearing, supra note 74, at 76-77 (reflecting defense counsel's argument that the
fact that defendants entered into negotiations prior to the time of release goes to the issue of good
faith). Late in the proceedings, the defendants also asserted that their use of the sample was "de
minimis." Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 79, at 20. This was not, however, an assertion of a
"de minimis defense" to infringement. (That doctrine is discussed infra Section II.B.2.) Defendants'
argument was merely that an injunction requiring recall of the album would be disproportionate to the
small scale of the offense. Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 79, at 20. Indeed, by this point in
the proceedings, the defendants conceded that it would be appropriate to impose money damages. Id.
S1 See Fichtelberg Deposition, supra note 70, at 33, 38-39, 41 ("Generally, we try to work them
out before the release, and in a lot of cases they get worked out after the release."); Nov. 26 Hearing,
supra note 74, at 126, 134 (testimony of Fredrick Silber, Vice President of Business Affairs, EMI
Music Publishing) (establishing general industry custom and practice with regard to sampling).
82 Nov. 26 Hearing, supra note 74, at 135 (testimony of Jane Peterer). The music-publishing
executive testified that he had refused permission "on a few occasions, generally when we feel a song
is either so obscene or... politically incorrect that we don't want our song to be associated with them
[sic]." Id. at 129 (testimony of Fredrick Silber, Vice President of Business Affairs, EMI Music
Publishing).
83 See Nov. 26 Hearing, supra note 74, at 19-23 (testimony of Raymond "Gilbert" O'Sullivan)
(describing his protectiveness of "Alone Again (Naturally)" and his distaste for Biz Markie's song); id.
at 17-18 (stating that there was "[n]o way" Grand Upright had ever granted anyone in the United States
permission to use portions of O'Sullivan's master recording of "Alone Again (Naturally)").
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hearing, stating, "if a guy starts negotiations and they are not fruitful and
he goes ahead and does it anyway, then that might be taken to be some
evidence of wilfulness [sic].,84 In this context, it is clear why the opinion
stated that the "only issue" in the case was whether Grand Upright owned
the copyrights.85 Since the defendants had conceded using the sample
without permission, and the judge had rejected their justification for doing
so, ownership was indeed the sole remaining issue. Satisfied that Grand
Upright had proven ownership, 86 the court granted a preliminary injunction
against further sale of the album. 87
Leading commentators have unfairly criticized the Grand Upright
opinion for failing to consider a fair use defense.88 But since the
defendants conceded that unauthorized sampling constitutes infringement,
they never raised, even implicitly, the fair use defense. It would have been
unnecessary, if not improper, for the court to consider such a defense on its
own motion. Furthermore, the opinion merely addressed an application for
a preliminary injunction; the defense could have been raised and
considered later had the case progressed to trial.
The defendants' concessions with respect to sample clearance
requirements appear to reflect industry practice of the time. A vice
president of EMI Music Publishing, testifying as an expert on sample
clearance, stated that he was the defacto head of sample clearance for EMI
(a major record label).89 In less than three years with the company, he had
been involved in "approximately 100, 120" instances in which EMI's
material was sampled and "settled about 15 or 20" cases in which EMI
artists had been accused of sampling without permission.9"
Biz Markie, Cold Chillin' and Warner Brothers all appreciated the risk
of copyright liability in releasing a sample-heavy record, and allocated that
risk by contract. With respect to any copyright infringement, Cold Chillin'
was obligated to indemnify Warner Brothers and the artist was obligated to
indemnify Cold Chillin'. 91 Biz Markie, in deposition testimony, stated that
4 Nov. 26 Hearing, supra note 74, at 77.
85 Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
1
6
1d. at 183-84.
871d. at 185.
88 See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247,
300 n.313 (1998); Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REv.
873, 896 n.126 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1997)).
89 Nov. 26 Hearing, supra note 74, at 120, 124-25 (testimony of Fredrick Silber, Vice President
of Business Affairs, EMI Music Publishing).
90Id. at 124-25.
91 See Fichtelberg Deposition, supra note 70, at 34. Biz Markie's lawyers suggested that Cold
Chillin' had a cavalier attitude about sample clearance because of this indemnification arrangement.
See Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 185 (quoting August 16 letter to Cold Chillin').
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he had an obligation-which he fulfilled-to give completed tapes of his
work to his lawyer, whose "job" was to then obtain clearances for the
samples used in the tapes.
92
Biz Markie's lawyers assumed from the outset that copyright
permission would be required. After the album was recorded, but before it
was released, the lawyers sent a tape of "Alone Again" to Grand Upright's
representative and requested permission to release the song as part of the
album.93 Before permission was obtained, however, Cold Chillin' Records
delivered the master recording of I Need a Haircut to Warner Brothers and
Warner Brothers released it.94 The premature release does not mean Cold
Chillin' thought sample clearance was unnecessary; it had scrupulously
observed clearance requirements with respect to other samples on the same
album. For example, when Biz Markie's lawyer had difficulty obtaining
permission to use a sample in another song, Cold Chillin's president had
tried to help.95 When the request was denied, Cold Chillin' dropped the
offending song from the album, even though this required creating a costly
new master recording of the entire album.96
The court's opinion has been criticized-ridiculed, even-for opening
with the Biblical proscription "Thou shalt not steal. 97 One commentator
has argued that this evidences "a disdainful, if not contemptuous, view by
judges for the type of musical borrowing involved in hip hop as a genre." 98
But these commentators take the sentence out of context. The sentence is
not about sampling generally; it is about an admittedly unauthorized
instance of sampling in a case where the defendants themselves conceded
92 Deposition of Marcel Hall (a/k/a Biz Markie) at 48, 51, Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. 182 (No.
91 Civ. 7648) [hereinafter Biz Markie Deposition] ("I just knew when I was done with my album, I
make tapes and I give it [sic] to my lawyer and he clears them. That's all I know.").
9' Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 184; see New Spin, supra note 62, at 744 (citing, in the Editor's
Note, a December 18, 1991 telephone interview with Robert Cinque, lawyer for the Grand Upright
defendants).
94 See Fichtelberg Deposition, supra note 70, at 35-37, 42 ("[W]e could have held the album if
the records weren't pressed, but they were pressed and then, you know, I just had to release it, you
know.").
95 See id. at 29-31 (explaining that Leonard Fichtelberg, the President of Cold Chillin' Records
had called the manager of the Eagles, the rock group Biz Markie had sampled from, to see whether he
could get the Eagles to clear the sample).96 1d.
9' Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183 (quoting Exodus 20:15). The many critics who have
singled out this passage include Arewa, supra note 10, at 580 (suggesting the court's use of the quote in
the decision demonstrated its negative view of hip hop); K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black
Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 382 n.202 (1999)
(stating that the judge who wrote the opinion cited no other authority than the bible quote); Justin
Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHA.M L. REV. 575, 579 n.15 (2005)
(arguing that the court's use of the quote in the decision oversimplified statutory provisions for sound
recordings); Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 410 (2003) (asserting that
copyright laws are more complex than the biblical quote would suggest).
98 Arewa, supra note 10, at 581.
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that copyright permission was required. Indeed, Biz Markie himself
seemed to agree with the judge's characterization of knowing and
deliberate infringement as theft. When asked in his deposition if he
understood the meaning of copyright infringement, he replied, "[t]hat
means something that was copyrighted already and I stole it."99 Nothing in
his deposition suggests he believed he had (or deserved) a right to sample
without permission; as noted above, he understood and accepted the
clearance requirement and argued only that the failure to get clearance was
his lawyer's fault.
Grand Upright, then, did not announce a change in legal doctrine; nor
did it require any change in business or artistic practice in the recording
industry. By the time of Grand Upright, the industry appears to have
already reached a consensus interpretation of samplers' obligations under
the Copyright Act, and appears to have been successfully implementing
that interpretation. While it is possible that the judicial stamp of approval
may have added legitimacy to the practice of sample clearance, the practice
needed no such affirmation. For all practical purposes, this practice was
already the "law," despite the lack of specific pronouncements on sampling
by courts or Congress. This "law" did not prevent the artistic or
commercial development of sampling; indeed, it coexisted with some of
the most artistically and commercially successful examples of sample-
based hip-hop.
B. "Slice-and-Dice: " More Samples, More Problems?
1. Clearance Requirements and Multiple Samples
Biz Markie's 1991 "Alone Again" was a rap-plus-pop-tune hybrid
along the lines of 1979's "Rapper's Delight." Since the early days of hip-
hop, however, many artists and producers had used sampling in more
ambitious and transformative ways.100  By the late 1980s, digital
technology enabled producers to take the mix-and-match aesthetic of
turntablism to new extremes. Thus many artistically and commercially
important albums of the late 1980s and early 1990s used brief samples,
transformed by digital processing and combined in large numbers to create
dense, layered pieces very different from their musical sources. For
convenience, this Article will (inelegantly and imprecisely) refer to more
complex combinations of samples as the "slice-and-dice" approach. 01 The
number of samples used increased the number of copyrights involved and,
presumably, the complexity of obtaining permission. Many commentators
argue that the requirement of obtaining sample clearances for samples
99 Biz Markie Deposition, supra note 92, at 6-7.
100 See supra notes 47-49 & 54 (discussing the work of Steinski and Grandmaster Flash).
101 James Boyle uses the term "wall of sound" to refer to this style. BOYLE, supra note 18, at 148.
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(supposedly created by Grand Upright) made the cost of producing slice-
and-dice music prohibitive.
10 2
Although this argument may sound plausible in theory, it is an
ahistorical one. Complex combinations of multiple sources were common
in early hip-hop DJing and, as noted above, had already been commercially
recorded by Grandmaster Flash by 1981. Furthermore, as argued above,
sample clearance was already an established practice, and slice-and-dice
practitioners appear to have observed it just as other hip-hop artists did.
For example, in 1989 (two years before Grand Upright), the Beastie
Boys and their producers, the Dust Brothers, released the critically praised,
sample-heavy album Paul's Boutique. They sought and obtained
clearances for the many samples used in the album-at a cost said to have
been between $200,000 and $250,000.103 The year 1989 saw another
landmark example of hip-hop sampling: De La Soul's commercially and
critically successful album, 3 Feet High and Rising. Like Grand Upright,
it also spawned a copyright dispute that is incorrectly blamed for helping to
establish a clearance requirement for sampling.104
In fact, like Paul's Boutique, the 3 Feet High and Rising story actually
shows that the clearance practices outlined in the Grand Upright testimony
were an accepted part of slice-and-dice production by 1989. One song on
3 Feet High and Rising used an unauthorized sample from "You Showed
Me," a 1969 record by the Turtles. When members of the Turtles
threatened to sue Tommy Boy Records for releasing the album'0 5 the label
agreed to a settlement.10 6  De La Soul and Prince Paul, the album's
producer, never asserted a right to sample without permission. Indeed,
they believed copyright clearance to be legally and ethically required.
Band member Mase believes the Turtles "rightfully" sued, stating: "That's
fine. That was cool.' 1 7 As in Grand Upright, copyright responsibility
appears to have been understood and allocated by contract. The group and
its producer maintain that Tommy Boy was contractually obligated to
102 See id.; CHRISTOPHER R. WEINGARTEN, IT TAKES A NATION OF MILLIONS TO HOLD Us BACK
40-41 (2010).
1
0 3 BRIAN COLEMAN, CHECK THE TECHNIQUE: LINER NOTES FOR THE HIP-Hop JUNKIES 17
(2007).
104 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 141.
105 The threatened suit was apparently based on sound recording rights, as the Turtles did not
write the song: it was composed by Roger McGuinn (a/Ida Jim McGuinn) and Gene Clark of the folk-
rock group The Byrds. See THE BYRDS, PREFLYTE (Together Records 1969).
06 Robert Hilbum, Alive and Rapping, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1991, at 6.
107 Fresh Air: Dave and Mase from De La Soul Discuss Their Music NPR (Sept. 1, 2005); see
also Patrick O'Neil, The Madminute with Posnudos [sic], MX, May 13, 2003, at 4 (quoting Posdnuos, a
member of De La Soul, as saying, "They have the right to have their music protected and we want our
samples protected"); Angus Batey, Last Chance to Comprehend, HIPHOP.COM (Apr. 7, 2009),
http://www.hiphop.com/features/60-de-la-soul-3-feet-feature-part-two (quoting Dave, another band
member).
[Vol. 44:415
REMIX WITHOUT ROMANCE
obtain clearances for the album (a claim that Tommy Boy has apparently
not disputed).108
Despite the established practice of seeking clearances, Tommy Boy
apparently chose to take the risk of being sued in the future instead of
bearing the upfront cost of licensing. Although commentators have
decried the idea that the Turtles should have been paid for a "sliver" of a
song,109 that criticism fails to consider the fact that the "sliver"-no less
than the services of a backup musician, composer, or engineer-was one of
the economic inputs that made up an immensely successful commercial
product. In 1989, 3 Feet High and Rising reached number one on the
Billboard R&B album chart and number twenty-four on the Billboard Hot
200 chart." 0 According to Prince Paul, "even after the law suit [against
Tommy Boy] I got a nice royalty cheque [from Tommy Boy].""'
Members of the legendary hip-hop group Public Enemy have
expressed less enthusiasm about the practice of obtaining clearances, but
they appear nonetheless to have been complying with industry practice
even before Grand Upright. This did not prevent them from pioneering
slice-and-dice digital sampling in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Hank
Shocklee, the producer of Public Enemy's classic albums, stated that "by
the late 1980s" copyright holders were granting permission to use samples
"for around $1500," and prices rose dramatically thereafter. 112  The
existence of known prices obviously suggests that paying for permission
was a common practice. Shocklee's complaint about high prices seems to
suggest that Public Enemy was in the habit of paying for permission,
despite claiming otherwise in other interviews'13 and in a rap song.' 
14
Public Enemy's professed anti-licensing stance must also be considered in
108 See Fresh Air, supra note 107 ("[W]e turned in all sample information [to Tommy Boy] and
what we sampled and what we needed cleared. And unfortunately, the record label just didn't take its
time ...."); see also Batey, supra note 107 ("We went through the process of making sure we had all
the information. Unfortunately ... Tommy Boy didn't take the opportunity to clear all the samples
prior to the record's release ....").
109 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 141.
1103 Feet High and Rising: Charts and Awards, ALLMUSIC.COM, http://www.allmusic.com/
albumn/3-feet-high-and-rising-r27752/charts-awards.
1 Batey, supra note 107.
112 WEINGARTEN, supra note 102, at 41.
113 Despite his complaint about clearance costs quoted in the text, Shocklee has elsewhere claimed
he "never really cleared the samples" on the group's earlier albums. MCLEOD, supra note 57, at 78.
But in the same interview, he seemed to contradict himself by saying the higher cost of clearances
started "catching up to us" by 1990. Id.
"4 In a 1988 Public Enemy song, vocalist Chuck D rapped that "the courts" have accused Public
Enemy of stealing because of its sampling, for which he "paid zero." See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra
note 10, at 144-45 (quoting PUBLIC ENEMY, Caught-Can We Get a Witness?, on IT TAKES A NATION
OF MILLIONS TO HOLD US BACK (Deflam/Columbia Records 1988)). But this appears to be poetic
license. There does not appear to have been a court disposition, or even a lawsuit filed, with respect to
any Public Enemy sample.
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light of the fact that Chuck D, Public Enemy's leader and lead vocalist,
brought two infringement suits (one against a fellow rapper) alleging
unauthorized sampling of his voice."'
Grand Upright did not spell the end of sampling generally or slice-
and-dice specifically, despite some commentators' unfounded insistence
that hip-hop went into decline in response to the opinion.' 6 Even Biz
Markie continued to use samples on his next album, prudently entitled All
Samples Cleared! Many knowledgeable observers of hip-hop music
believe it reached an artistic peak in the early to mid-1990s-that is, a few
years after the Grand Upright opinion. For example, one recent scholarly
study opines that "for sheer volume of classic hip-hop it is difficult to
surpass 1993-94.'' 17
Even assuming prices were rising, sampling remained a common
method of hip-hop production through the 1990s and remains so today.
During the 1990s, sampling techniques continued to develop. Slice-and-
dice never entirely went away, although it underwent some permutations.
Indeed, in 1996, Beck's hip-hop influenced album, Odelay, introduced
slice-and-dice to a broad mainstream audience." 8  The album was
produced by the Dust Brothers, who also produced Paul's Boutique, and
the album has a similar sound made up of dense, layered samples. Many
slice-and-dice artists began to use samples that were of obscure origin and
cut and processed them even more radically. A hip-hop artist, DJ Shadow,
is credited with inspiring this trend, sometimes described as a subgenre
called "trip-hop."" 9
If clearance fees indeed increased at the end of the 1980s, it was likely
due to changed market conditions: artistic fashion, popular taste, and
technological advances had combined to increase the value of copyrighted
recordings and compositions. If, indeed, copyright holders charged higher
rates for copyright clearance, that was presumably possible only because
sample-based music was generating greater revenues. The argument that
copyright holders raised clearance prices so high as to prevent the use of
samples defies economic logic. Indeed, the emergence of sample clearance
as a revenue stream may have made it easier to obtain sample clearance by
115 See Randy Reiss, Public Enemy's Chuck D Settles B.LG. Copyright Suit, VH1 (Nov. 17, 1998,
10:22 PM), http://www.vhl.com/news/articles/504067/11171998/chuck_d.jhtml.
116 See BOYLE supra, note 18, at 148 (claiming that the "wall of sound" approach gave way to
"simplistic thumping beat" and the "unimaginative synthesizer lines of modem rap");
VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 143-44 (opining that the Biz Markie case "stole the soul" of hip-
hop).
17 THE ANTHOLOGY OF RAP, supra note 31, at 330.
118 The album won two Grammy awards. See Past Winners Search, GRAMMY.COM,
http://www.grammy.com/nominees/search?artist=Beck&title=&year=All&genre--All.
119 DJ Shadow Biography, WORLD OF TRIP-HoP, http://triphop-music.com/band/dj-shadow (last
visited Sept. 19, 2011).
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giving record companies incentive to process-and grant-clearance
requests instead of simply ignoring them. Many record companies,
including Universal Music and BMG Music, now provide easily accessible
online forms for would-be samplers to request copyright clearance. 120
2. Bridgeport v. Dimension Films: Another Misunderstood Decision
Ironically, while pioneering slice-and-dice groups like Public Enemy,
the Beastie Boys, and De La Soul seem to have assumed they were
obligated to pay clearances for their samples, unauthorized slice-and-dice
might have been legally defensible. Chuck D of Public Enemy seems to
have believed in the late 1980s that he was obligated to obtain clearances
even for "unrecognizable" samples.12' But many of the brief,
unrecognizable samples in "slice-and-dice" productions arguably did not
require copyright permission. In doctrinal terms, they arguably involved
only de minimis copying and lacked "substantial similarity" to their source
material. 122 Indeed, several later cases have applied this doctrine to find
that brief samples did not infringe upon copyrights in the underlying
composition. 123 Most notably, in the 2002 case Newton v. Diamond 24 a
federal district court used this reasoning to hold that a three-note sample in
a Beastie Boys record was non-infringing.125
Slice-and-dice samples may also fall under the "fair use" exception to
copyright infringement for similar reasons. One of the factors supporting a
fair use exception is "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
12
0 See RICHARD STIM, GETTING PERMISSION: HOW TO LICENSE & CLEAR COPYRIGHTED
MATERIALS ONLINE AND OFF 161-63 (3d ed. 2007) (listing music clearance companies).
121 MCLEOD, supra note 57, at 68.
122 See Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[A] plaintiff
must first show his work was copied by proving access and substantial similarity between the
works ...."). For a contemporaneous case suggesting the de minimis exception, see Vault Corp. v.
QuaidSoftware Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the use of thirty characters out
of fifty pages of computer source code was de minimis). The de minimis exception was made clearer in
subsequent cases, most notably Ringgold v. Black Entm 't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir.
1997) (finding the use of a copyrighted poster as set decoration on a television show was not de
minimis where it was partially visible for about twenty-five seconds and almost entirely visible for
about five seconds) and Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1998)
(finding fleeting, unrecognizable glimpses of copyrighted photos in a movie were de minimis and thus
noninfringing).
123 See Staggs v. West, Civ. No. PJM 08-728, 2009 WL 2579665, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 17, 2009)
(dismissing a claim that a sample in a hip-hop song violated the copyright in a composition because "an
ordinary listener-the Court in this case-would quickly determine that the melodies of the songs are
not similar"); Jean v. Bug Music, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4022(DC), 2002 WL 287786, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
27, 2002) (holding that a sample was de minimis and did not infringe the copyright in the composition
because "[o]nly three words and notes in the [two songs] are identical. Overall the songs are different
in sound and they convey different moods").
124 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
125Id. at 1259.
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relation to the copyrighted work as a whole . 126 Furthermore, as the
127Supreme Court held in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., a use that
"adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering
the [source] with new expression, meaning, or message" has a
"transformative" character that weighs in favor of a fair use
determination. 128  Neither this "transformation" argument nor the de
minimis defense seems applicable to the song at issue in Grand Upright,
which used a significant and recognizable portion of its source material. 129
It was, then, unclear after Grand Upright whether copyright doctrine
required clearance for slice-and-dice sampling.
The status of slice-and-dice remains unclear even today, decades after
it first appeared in hip-hop. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,'
30
the circuit decision most closely on point, was not decided until 2005. In
that case, the Sixth Circuit rejected the de minimis defense with respect to a
sample used in "100 Miles and Runnin' ("100 Miles"), a song by the rap
group NWA. The song contained a brief sample of a keening, siren-like
electric guitar passage from a record by the group Funkadelic. 131 Although
some commentators argue that Bridgeport placed a burden on innovative
music, 132 "100 Miles" was eleven years old by the time the lawsuit was
filed, and fifteen years old by the time the court handed down its
decision. 133 "100 Miles" was recorded in 1990, and reflected the slice-and-
dice style of that era. One commentator noted that the same Funkadelic
song had previously been sampled by Public Enemy, and that "100 Miles"
imitated the production style Hank Shocklee used on Public Enemy records
in the late 1980s.134 The lawsuit in Bridgeport was not against NWA or its
record company, but against No Limit Films, a company that used "100
Miles," and hence the Funkadelic sample, in a 1998 movie.
135
As noted above, cases such as Newton v. Diamond had by this time
recognized the de minimis defense to claims of infringement on
composition copyrights. Bridgeport, however, involved only the copyright
in a sound recording, and the court held that the de minimis doctrine is
.26 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006).
127 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
Id. at 579 (citing Pierre N. Leval, Towarda Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111
(1990)); see also Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'n Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 143 n.9 (2d Cir.
1998) (stating that a secondary work does not infringe the copyright of the original work if it
"sufficiently transforms the expression of the original work").
'
2 9 See supra text accompanying notes 68-70 (describing the song).
130 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
'3' Id. at 796.
132 Tim Wu, Jay-Z Versus the Sample Troll, SLATE (Nov. 16, 2006, 1:50 PM), www.slate.com/id/
2153961.
... See Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 795 (stating that the action commenced in 2001).
134 see WEINGARTEN, supra note 102, at 70-71.
13' Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 795.
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unavailable in that context. 3 6  The court pointed to Sections 106 and
114(b) of the Copyright Act, which give the owner of the sound recording
copyright the exclusive right to make derivative works "in which the actual
sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise
altered in sequence or quality.', 137 Bridgeport interpreted this to mean that
the owner of the sound recording copyright had the exclusive right to
prepare all such works, without regard to limitations courts had imposed in
other copyright contexts, such as the substantial similarity requirement or
de minimis exception.
Some commentators decry Bridgeport for prohibiting the slice-and-
dice approach. 38 But, like the condemnation of Grand Upright, this is a
misreading of the holding. First of all, no form of sampling is prohibited
as long as clearance is obtained. Second, and moreover, the case simply
does not hold that clearance is required for slice-and-dice generally, or
even for "100 Miles' specifically. Although the opinion glibly states at
one point, "[g]et a license or do not sample,"'139 in fact, the holding is
limited to rejecting the substantial similarity requirement and the related de
minimis defense in the sound recording context. The court did not even
hold "100 Miles" to be an infringing use. Rather, it reversed the lower
court's finding of noninfringement (which had been based on the de
minimis defense) and remanded the case for a new trial. Indeed, the Sixth
Circuit in Bridgeport specifically stated that the trial court on remand
could consider a fair use defense (which had not been reached below) and
the appeals court "express[ed] no opinion on its applicability to these
facts." 14
0
Even to the extent that it rejected the de minimis defense in the context
of sound-recording infringement, the import of Bridgeport is overstated.
Bridgeport is the decision of only one circuit, and not one that is especially
influential with respect to copyright law. Indeed, in a 1976 case involving
an analog version of sampling, the Ninth Circuit stated that the "substantial
136 Id. at 798-802. The court found that the plaintiff, Bridgeport Music, did not own the rights to
sample the composition; they had been retained by the previous owner of the composition. Id. at 796,
808.
137 Id. at 799.
131 See John Schietinger, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: How the Sixth Circuit
Missed a Beat on Digital Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 209, 209 (2005) (claiming that, due to
Bridgeport, "the way DJ Shadow and others make music may change forever"); Gary Young, Court
Clamps Down on Sampling, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 27, 2004 (stating that one music-industry lawyer believes
Bridgeport will "kill off the art form of hip-hop"); Renee Graham, Will Ruling on Samples Chill Rap?,
Bos. GLOBE, Sept. 14, 2004, at Dl ("[Tihere's little doubt that the judges who came to this devastating
decision may well end up stifling the artistry and creativity their ruling sought to protect.").
"' Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 801.
140 Id. at 805. In an analogous case, the Second Circuit held that a visual artist was protected by
fair use with respect to his painting that incorporated a recognizable scanned portion of a copyrighted
photograph. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246, 256-58 (2d Cir. 2006).
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similarity" requirement applies to sound recordings.' 4 1 Moreover, it turns
on a questionable interpretation of the Copyright Act. By rejecting the de
minimis exception in the sound-recording context, Bridgeport effectively
makes the scope of sound-recording copyrights broader than that of other
copyrights. The statutory language and legislative history of section 114,
however, strongly suggest that it was intended to make the scope of sound
recording copyrights narrower than those of other copyrights. 142  In
addition, at least one federal district court has explicitly rejected
Bridgeport and applied the de minimis doctrine to find that a one-second
sample did not infringe upon a sound recording copyright. 1
43
The impact of Bridgeport is overstated for another reason. Whatever
the legal arguments against Bridgeport's reasoning, the opinion appears,
like Grand Upright before it, to have been consistent with existing industry
practices-practices under which sampling flourished. By the late 1980's,
it was well-established practice in the music industry to seek copyright
permission both for lengthy, recognizable samples and for briefer, slice-
and-dice samples. 44 In fact, NWA itself reportedly sought and obtained
sample clearance when it originally recorded "100 Miles" in 1990.145
Indeed, Bridgeport's differing treatment of de minimis borrowings
from compositions and those from sound recordings seems to reflect earlier
practice by the Beastie Boys. The aforementioned Newton v. Diamond
case involved the 1992 Beastie Boys song, "Pass the Mic.' 46  The song
included a sample of a brief flute passage from a recording of a jazz
composition entitled Choir.14 7 The Beastie Boys did not obtain permission
from the composer, who owned the copyright in the composition, but
141 United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d. 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1976) ("We believe the [jury] instruction
went beyond the law insofar as it purported to characterize any and all re-recordings as infringements,
but the subsequent inclusion of a comparison test permitted the jury to consider 'substantial similarity,'
and cured any error in the earlier part of the instruction."). The defendants sold music they had made
by re-recording (on audio tape) parts of pop-music recordings, altering the tapes, and combining them
with other sounds. Id. at 964.
142 See Leslie A. Kurtz, Digital Actors and Copyright-From The Polar Express to Simone, 21
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 783, 794-95 n.80 (2005) ("Section 14 ... provides a
limitation on a copyright owner's exclusive rights, not a grant of additional rights.").
143 Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327, 1338-41 (S.D. Fla. 2009). In a
pre-Bridgeport case, the Southern District of New York stressed the importance of substantial
similarity analysis in deciding whether sampling constituted infringement. Williams v. Broadus, No.
99 Civ. 10957 MBM, 2001 WL 984714, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2001).
1" See supra notes 103-15 and accompanying text (describing clearance practices and slice-and-
dice albums by the Beastie Boys, De La Soul, and Public Enemy in the late 1980s).
145 See WEINGARTEN supra note 102, at 70-71. Note that this is yet another example of a sampler
seeking copyright clearance prior to Grand Upright.
146 Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1246 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
147 Id. (reporting that the defendants copied a three-note, six-second long sequence which they
then looped).
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avoided liability on de minimis grounds. 148 But while the Beastie Boys had
not sought permission to use the composition, they had sought and
obtained clearance to use the sound recording. 149 It is possible that, some
thirteen years before Bridgeport, the Beastie Boys (or, more likely, the
lawyers for their record label, Capitol/EMI) understood that a de minimis
defense might excuse the unauthorized use of a composition, but might not
apply in the sound-recording context.
Capitol/EMI may have sought sound-recording clearance for another
reason-the same major record companies that release records containing
samples also own huge back catalogs of recordings that might be sampled.
They therefore have an economic incentive to support a rigid practice of
sample clearance. As noted above, however, Bridgeport explicitly
acknowledges the possibility of a fair use defense for the sampling of
sound recordings. Thus, the decision may actually open the door to a legal
treatment of slice-and-dice that is more permissive than the music
industry's prevailing interpretation. Indeed, Bridgeport's
acknowledgement of the fair-use defense may explain the recent
invocation of that doctrine by the musician Girl Talk, who has openly
refused to pay clearance fees for even the most obvious samples. 150
3. Law and Cost Do Not Necessarily Determine Cultural Practice
Legal scholars' insistence that law is determinative of cultural
participation is an example of thinking like a lawyer, not like an artist.
Some practices are unaffected by the law, and factors other than law shape
cultural practice. The potential cost of sample permission has been known
since "Rapper's Delight" first became a hit, but this did not prevent
sampling from becoming a dominant method of production in hip-hop and
other kinds of pop music.
Despite the insistence of many musicians and commentators, the law
has little impact on some kinds of sampling. Chuck D has complained that
he had to obtain clearance even when samples were "unrecognizable."
151
Leading commentators insist that legal decisions spelled the end of "slice-
and-dice" sampling. 152 It is theoretically possible that a clear requirement
of permission for every sample could make clearing multiple samples
extremely expensive. But such a rule would not necessarily preclude slice-
and-dice sampling, due to a venerable legal principle: it's only illegal if
148 Id. at 1259.
"41 Id at 1246.
150 See Robert Levine, Steal This Hook? D.J. Skirts Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug 7, 2008, at
El.
151 MCLEOD, supra note 57, at 68.
152 VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 143 ("Rap music since 1991 has been marked by a severe
decrease in the amount of sampling."); see also MCLEOD, supra note 57, at 82-83 (arguing that Public
Enemy's classic albums could not be made today due to changes in the law).
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you get caught. If samples of copyrighted material are sufficiently brief,
obscure, and/or altered, or the resultant work is not widely distributed, the
copyright holder may simply never know the material was used. 153 For
such samples, de minimis, fair use and, indeed, all copyright laws, are
irrelevant in practical terms. This principle is not limited to sampling; it
applies to any uses of copyrighted material. DJ Shadow clearly understood
this: In the early 1990s, he released several singles on small independent
labels154 without obtaining sample clearance. 55  He did not seek any
clearances until the release of his first album in 1996, and even then he
only sought them for a small number of recognizable samples: as Shadow
noted, "there's probably 1,000 samples on [the album] and I think we
cleared 10 or so.
' '156
Even when the law does impose costs on sampling, artists may be
willing to pay those costs for the sake of innovation. There is considerable
irony in the "free culture" argument that strong copyright laws discourage
sampling by increasing its cost. It is, in effect, the same argument behind
the traditional economic defense of strong copyright laws: that protecting
profitability is necessary to incentivize creativity.157  The history of
sampling, however, suggests otherwise. Profit potential may inspire
imitation after an artistic innovation is made, but profit alone does not
necessarily provide the incentive for such innovation. As noted above, for
example, Steinski did not release his pioneering "Lesson 1" commercially
due to concerns about clearance costs. Nonetheless, "Lesson 1" was
widely played in clubs and on radio, and Steinski became a successful and
highly influential record producer. 158 According to Steinski, "the legality
of this doesn't really make any difference to me . .. I mean, I'm gonna
make the records no matter what."' 159 Even if the law should offer
1 Cf Peter Dicola, An Economic View of Legal Restrictions on Musical Borrowing and
Appropriation, in MAKING AND UNMAKING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CREATIVE PRODUCTION IN
LEGAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 235,242 (Mario Biagioli et al. eds., 2011) ("Many musicians...
can either distribute their recordings for free ... or sell their recordings through small outlets ... while
hoping to avoid detection, litigation, or prosecution.").154 See Discography, DJSHADOw.COM, http://www.djshadow.com/discography# (last visited Nov.
9, 2011).
155 See Adam Heimlich, The Shadow Sheds Light, SALON.COM (Sept. 23, 1998),
http://www.salon.com/entertainment/music/int/1998/09/23int.html.
156 See id. (quoting DJ Shadow as saying he sought clearance for "things that I based an entire
song on, just because I knew it'd be recognizable to whoever did it"). Based on this comment, it is
unclear whether his sample-clearance practices were based solely on liability concerns, or whether they
also reflect the ethical norms expressed by De La Soul and MC Hammer.
1 The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution reflects this basic theory: it empowers Congress
to protect the intellectual property rights of "Authors and Inventors" in order "to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cf. 8.
158 See WNYC Soundcheck, Steinski Gives a Sampling History Lesson, NPR (Oct. 22, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=93844583.
159 Id.
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incentives for recoding, the law need only guarantee appropriators a
chance at a reasonable reward-not all the proceeds from the derivative
work. Indirect rewards have evidently been sufficient to incentivize
Steinski.
The more recent story of The Grey Album is similar. In 2004, Danger
Mouse (Brian Burton) mixed the vocals from rapper Jay-Z's 2003 The
Black Album with music sampled from the Beatles' self-titled 1968 album,
commonly known as The White Album. 60  When the result, The Grey
Album, appeared for sale online, the EMI record label accused Burton and
the retailers of infringing upon its copyright in the White Album sound
recording. 161  Burton argued that it had been released without his
permission, and had been intended as a noncommercial "art project.' ' 162 He
became something of a cause cgltbre among anti-copyright activists, even
though he expressly denied any intent to challenge copyright laws, and
readily cooperated with EMI in stopping online sales. 63 The Grey Album
was thus removed from the market, but as "Lesson 1" did for Steinski, it
established Burton as a significant musician and producer, and inspired
legions of imitators in the so-called "mashup" genre of similarly
hybridized songs.164
Some commentators assert, with no real evidence, that less sampling
has occurred in the post-Grand Upright era.165 Such a claim is difficult to
support without an exhaustive longitudinal study of records. But, even
assuming such a change occurred, it could have had causes other than case
law, such as a change in the styles and methods preferred by artists (or
their audiences). Many commentators complain that the classic slice-and-
dice albums by Public Enemy, De La Soul, and the Beastie Boys could not
be made today due to the cost of obtaining clearances, 166 but even if true,
the complaint is an odd one. Those important albums were made, over two
decades ago, and it is unclear why it would be necessary to make the same
(or fundamentally similar) albums again. 67  On their next album after
Paul's Boutique, the Beastie Boys used far less sampling and played their
160 See MATTHEW RIMMER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION: HANDS OFF
MY IPOD 132 (2007).
161 Id. at 133.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 See id. at 145-46 (stating that Jay-Z and the rock group Linkin Park collaborated on a series of
"mash-ups" in an effort to emulate the success of The Grey Album and that, despite his alleged
copyright infiingement actions, Burton has been "fRted" by members of the musical industry).
165 See, e.g., VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 143 ("Rap music since 1991 has been marked
by a severe decrease in the amount of sampling.").
6 See, e.g., MCLEOD, supra note 57, at 82-83; WEINGARTEN, supra note 102, at 41.
167 See infra Section I1I.B.1 (arguing that musical forms should not be subject to "static
reification").
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own instruments. 168 Band member Mike Diamond made a good argument
for this artistic change, as well as for the general irrelevance of the law: "I
don't know if I'd say that Paul's Boutique took the sampling thing as far as
it could be taken, but we came close. So we definitely didn't want to jump
right back into that same direction."'
169
Just as artists may have decided to move on, the record industry seems
to have recognized the greater sales potential of simpler hip-hop records
with recognizable tunes instead of multiple samples. Two songs released
in 1990--"U Can't Touch This," by M.C. Hammer, and "Ice Ice Baby" by
Vanilla Ice-became two of the biggest hip-hop singles of all time.70
Each of these songs was, like "Rapper's Delight," a relatively simple
combination of a rap and the hook from a famous pop hit.'17
Legal disputes over sampling are not determinative of creative
innovation or the distribution of semiotic power. Rather, they are disputes
among members of the media industry over the distribution of the proceeds
from an existing, profitable method of joint production. The music
industry arrived at a method of distributing these proceeds by contract,
allowing innovation to proceed. This is not to say formal law is irrelevant:
the contracting was clearly based on the legal entitlements set out in the
Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976.172 The legal norm of negotiated sample
clearance did not prevent the development of hip-hop-to the contrary, it
can be seen as an important part of the development of hip-hop as an art
form and as an industry.
History shows, then, that commentators have greatly exaggerated
copyright law's stifling effect on recoding in popular music. Lawyers and
legal academics are (unsurprisingly) likely to overestimate the ability of
law to constrain productive and creative behavior. Copyright owners'
statutory entitlements are thus often portrayed as insuperable barriers to
sampling. The economic analysis of law, however, teaches that legal
entitlements can be reallocated by bargaining, at least where transaction
costs are sufficiently low. 173 That is, even if the right to sample belongs to
a copyright holder, a would-be sampler should be able to obtain
permission, as long as the costs of information, negotiation, and the like
168 COLEMAN, supra note 103, at 16.
169 Id. at 17.
1
7 0 DAN CHARNAS, THE BIG PAYBACK: THE HISTORY OF THE BUSINESS OF HIP-HoP 280-81
(2010).
171 See KEMBREW MCLEOD ET AL., CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL
SAMPLING 4, 113 (2011) (noting that "Ice Ice Baby" contains the bass line to Queen and David
Bowie's "Under Pressure," most of Rick James' "Superfreak" is used in MC Hammer's "U Can't
Touch This," and Chic's "Good Times" features prominently in "Rapper's Delight").
.72 See supra, Section II.A.2.
173 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual
Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235, 235-36 (1995).
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are not prohibitive.
While it cannot be assumed that bargaining can overcome transaction
costs in a given context, 174 history suggests that they were with respect to
sampling. In Calabresi and Melamed's famous formulation,17 copyright
law allocates sampling rights under a "property rule' ' 176-under which a
would-be user must bargain with the owner-as distinct from a "liability
rule"' 7 7-under which a user may use without permission as long as the
user pays damages. Copyright law is a "property" regime because
statutory damages under the Copyright Act are not limited to the owner's
actual damages.17 8 Moreover, the Act authorizes courts to use injunctions
"to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright,"' 179 (as seen in Grand
Upright) and copyright violations can be punished as crimes. 180
Calabresi and Melamed argued that because liability rules facilitate the
transfer of entitlements, they are preferable when transaction costs are
high.' 8' Some commentators have argued in favor of compulsory licensing
of copyrighted works in order to facilitate licensing.182 Such an approach
174 See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 174-78 (1988).
175 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1089-93 (1972).
176 Id. at 1092 (noting that the property rule involves "a collective decision as to who is to be
given an initial entitlement but not as to the value of the entitlement," i.e., it permits each of the parties
to say how much the entitlement is worth to him).
177 Id. at 1105-06 (defining liability rule as "an external, objective standard of value ... used to
facilitate the transfer of the entitlement from the holder to the nuisance").
171 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006) (entitling a copyright-infringement plaintiff to receive both
actual damages and the infringer's profits); id. § 504(c) (allowing a plaintiff to elect statutory damages
instead of actual damages); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright
Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 439, 441-43 (2009) (arguing that
statutory-damages awards are "arbitrary... and sometimes grossly excessive").
"9 17 U.S.C. § 502(a).
i80 See id § 506(a).
1s1 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 175, at 1127.
182 William Fisher has made perhaps the most fully developed compulsory-licensing proposal.
See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT 199-259 (2004).
The Copyright Act currently contains a compulsory licensing regime, but it applies only to
licensing new recordings of a musical work that has previously been recorded and publicly released.
17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1). Such new recordings are commonly referred to as "cover versions." Any
person may make and distribute phonorecords of a cover version, without permission of the owner of
the original work, provided the person provides notice to the owner and pays the owner the statutory
royalty rate. Id. § 115(b)-(c). Furthermore, the cover version "shall not change the basic melody or
fundamental character of the work." Id § 11 5(a)(2). Thus, for example, if Biz Markie had wanted to
record and release his own cover version of Gilbert O'Sullivan's "Alone Again, (Naturally)," he could
have done so without permission, provided he paid the statutory royalty.
Songs using digital samples, however, do not qualify for compulsory licenses. Take Markie's
actual "Alone Again" rap song, for example. First of all, the rap song changed both the "basic melody"
and the "fundamental character" of the composition. Second and moreover, Markie used a sample
from O'Sullivan's 1970 record, and the copying of sound recordings is expressly excluded from the
compulsory licensing scheme. Id. § 115(a)(]) ("A person may not obtain a compulsory license for use
of the work in the making of phonorecords duplicating a sound recording fixed by another,
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would be a "liability" regime in that it would allow users to "take and pay"
without obtaining permission. The history of sampling described above,
however, suggests that a "property" approach to sampling rights has been
appropriate thus far because transaction costs have been sufficiently low.
The music industry, faced with a property regime that potentially slowed
the transfer of sampling rights, responded by reducing transaction costs.
Sample clearance is simply one example of the transfer of copyright
entitlements. Such transfers are a basic part of the music industry. If
members of the industry had disagreed over whether sample clearance was
necessary (that is, over who owned the entitlement to sample), it might
have increased the transaction costs of each negotiation. But the evidence
discussed above strongly indicates that there was a consensus that
sampling rights belonged to copyright holders. 183  Transaction costs are
likely to have fallen further as sampling became more common and the
industry established business practices for seeking and granting clearance,
such as dedicated employees and indemnification clauses, 18 and, more
recently, online clearance processing. 185  Indeed, the evidence in Grand
Upright suggests that obtaining clearance was normally as simple as
sending out a few letters and making a few phone calls, which need not
even hold up the release of a record.
18 6
unless ... the making of the phonorecords was authorized by the owner of the copyright in the sound
recording ...."). That is, the scheme applies only to a recording of a new performance of a song, and
not to a recording that incorporates an existing recording of a song.
113 This follows from the fact that samplers are themselves artists and record labels with an
interest in protecting their own intellectual property.
"8 See the industry practices described in the Grand Upright testimony, supra Section II.A.3.
185 See STIM, supra note 120, at 179-80 (describing the practice by websites to include a linking
disclaimer in order to minimize liability for activities that occur when a visitor is taken to a linked
website).
186 Transaction costs of obtaining permission can be high if the work is an "orphan"-that is, if
the copyright owner is difficult to identify and/or contact. But this problem could be addressed by
relatively modest reforms far short of a compulsory licensing regime. In Canada, for example, a person
seeking copyright permission who cannot locate the owner may petition the Canadian Copyright Board
for a license, which will be granted if the user has conducted a reasonable search. See Canadian
Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, 77. The Board will also set a reasonable fee, which the user must
deposit into a fund from which the owner may collect if she comes forward at a later time. See id at
78. The U.S. Copyright Office has suggested a reform like Canada's "reasonable search" rule. Pamela
Samuelson et al., Copyright @ 300: The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1235-36 (2010). It has, however, rejected the idea of a fund like
Canada's. See Jeremy de Beer & Mario Bouchard, Canada's Orphan Works Regime: Unlocatable
Copyright Owners and the Copyright Board (report sponsored by the Copyright Board of Canada),
available at http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/about-apropos/2010-11 -19-newstudy.pdf.
When Google was recently sued for making digital copies of copyrighted books online, it
proposed a settlement that, like Canada's statutory scheme, involved an escrow fund should the owners
of orphan works come forward in the future. Pamela Samuelson, The Google Books Settlement as
Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 479, 524. The settlement was, however, rejected by a federal
court in March 2011 and no settlement had been approved as of fall 2011. See Julie Bosman, Judge
Sets Schedule in Case Over Google's Digital Library, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, at B8.
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III. CULTURAL AUTONOMY?
A. Recoding's Ambivalent Relationship to Semiotic Democracy
As a historical matter, then, copyright law has not prevented the
development of sampling. Many commentators argue that this is not
enough, however; they insist that the law should affirmatively facilitate
recoding in order to further semiotic democracy. For example, as noted
above, many commentators argue for a compulsory licensing regime,
either at centrally determined rates or at no charge. By limiting a copyright
owner's control over derivative works and allowing users to simply "take
and pay," a compulsory licensing regime would likely lower users' costs.
But it would do so by externalizing and subsidizing those costs; therefore,
it would not necessarily lower overall costs. A compulsory licensing
regime would subsidize users in that the public would bear the
considerable expense of administering such a regime. 187 Indeed, the huge
costs of creating and administering a comprehensive compulsory licensing
system could even end up increasing the total costs of copyright
licensing. 1
88
Whether the law should subsidize or otherwise facilitate recoding
depends on whether recoding is good for society. Even assuming recoding
advances semiotic democracy, subsidizing any method of cultural
production could do the same. The cost of a sample clearance, or other
type of copyright permission, is not significantly different from other costs
of cultural participation and expression, such as education, computers and
Internet connectivity, paint and canvas, or musical instruments. It is hardly
clear why, in a world of limited resources, copyright permission should be
subsidized while support for these other creative inputs remains limited.
The question, of course, is whether sampling and other kinds of
recoding have special social value, such as furthering semiotic democracy.
Addressing this question underscores the great irony of "free culture"
theory. On the one hand, as argued above in Part II, copyright law is far
friendlier to recoding than these theorists tend to believe. On the other
hand, as will be argued in this Part, recoding itself has potential negative
effects on semiotic democracy. The current academic discourse tends to
consider only the potential positive effects of recoding on cultural
participation. The central insight of the original theorists of semiotic
democracy and recoding, however, was that recoding had both positive and
negative effects on cultural participation. Today's legal academics need
187 See FISHER, supra note 182, at 169.
188 William Fisher's very thoughtful and thorough proposal for a compulsory licensing regime, for
example, involves an immense amount of costly administrative tasks, many of which are beyond the
capability of existing technology. See id. at 203-58.
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not agree with those previous cultural critics; it is of course appropriate to
challenge and "recode" earlier concepts. But the "recoding of recoding" in
contemporary intellectual property law has not seriously engaged the
original arguments; rather, it has largely ignored them.
The term "semiotic democracy" and its underlying theory were
formulated by the pioneers of "Cultural Studies," a neo-Marxist academic
movement in the United Kingdom.1 89 Liberalism understands the dangers
of an overbearing state, but tends to have excessive faith in the ability of
formally equal competition to allocate wealth and other forms of power
fairly and efficiently. Conversely, Marxist-influenced schools of thought,
like Cultural Studies, may underestimate the risks of state control, but their
critique of liberal capitalism offers insight into the limitations of allowing
power to be allocated via "market competition."
190
In the 1930s and 1940s, German-American academics of the so-called
"Frankfurt School" argued that the "culture industry" manipulates the
public into buying and enjoying mass-produced cultural products.191
Theodor Adorno, for example, argued that the music industry
manufactures popular music from simple, standardized patterns and
conditions the public to expect and respond favorably to such patterns. 192
In the 1970s and 1980s, Cultural Studies theorists modified this overly
patronizing view. They agreed that the public's consumption and
enjoyment of commercial mass culture is not fully autonomous, but argued
that it is not entirely manipulated either. The culture industries attempt to
impose their view of reality on the public, but meet with a mixture of
success and resistance. Dick Hebdige, for example, argued that youth
subcultures in postwar Britain (such as mods, rockers, and punks)
appropriated "mundane" consumer commodities--"a safety pin, a pointed
shoe, a motor cycle"-and imbued them with alternative "meanings which
express, in code, a form of resistance to the order which guarantees their
continued subordination.'
193
This concept of appropriation and redefinition-which has come to be
called "recoding"-became a central part of Cultural Studies theory.
189 See, e.g., JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 236-39 (1987) (arguing that "[t]elevision's
playfulness is a sign of its semiotic democracy"); Hall, supra note 25, at 232-33 (arguing that people
are not "purely passive" consumers of commercial culture, but they are subject to "cultural power and
domination" that results in a continuous "dialectic of cultural struggle"); id at 239 (arguing that
popular culture "is one of the places where socialism might be constituted").
190 William Fisher's proposal to remake copyright law is a bit of a hybrid: he seeks to realize a
combination of liberal participatory values and material goals (such as supplying affordable cultural
products and increasing economic production) through an ambitious plan of state action. FISHER, supra
note 182, at 202-03.
191 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
192 See THEODOR W. ADORNO, On Popular Music, in ESSAYS ON MUSIC 437, 441-44 (Richard
Leppert ed., 2002).
193 DICK HEBDIGE, SUBCULTURE: THE MEANING OF STYLE 2, 18 (Terence Hawks ed., 1979).
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According to Stuart Hall, a central figure in the development of Cultural
Studies, 194 members of the public are not merely "cultural dopes," but are
able to recognize the ways their lives are "reorganised, reconstructed, and
reshaped" by the way the media depicts them.195 Building on this notion,
John Fiske coined the related term "semiotic democracy" to describe
television. 196 Fiske asserted that television viewers question the intended
meaning of television programming and assign their own alternative
meanings to it, thereby deriving their own kind of pleasure from it.
197
Cultural Studies theorists maintained, however, that the autonomy of the
media audience "is only relative, and never total."' 98 The culture industries
constantly attempt to push meanings onto the public, and individuals
constantly push back by recoding: Hall termed this "the dialectic of
cultural struggle."' 99 Cultural appropriation, then, involves both autonomy
and domination.
Art and architecture critic Hal Foster expanded on Cultural Studies
theory in the 1980s and coined the term "recoding., 200  Foster noted that
most of his contemporaries in the art world saw cultural appropriation as "a
parodic collage of the privileged signs of gender, class and race" that
exposes and resists "the false nature of these stereotypes." 20' "Free
culture" theorists tend to espouse this vision, and even attribute it to
Foster.20 2  Foster, however, did not subscribe to this view. Rather, he
believed that these subversive aspirations were doomed to fail.203
Questioning cultural meanings does not challenge the cultural status quo,
he argued, because liberal capitalism does not depend on a set of fixed
cultural meanings. 204  To the contrary, he asserted, it depends on the
appearance of variety and consumer choice: "In our system of
commodities, fashions, styles, art works . . . it is difference that we
consume." 205  Thus, "[t]o expose its false nature, to manipulate its
'94 David Morley & Kuan-Hsing Chen, Introduction, in THE STUART HALL READER 1, 3 (Morley
& Chen eds., 1996) (describing Hall's work as "a catalyst for critical dialogues and as a key site on
which they have taken place within cultural studies, since the mid-1980s).
195 Hall, supra note 25, at 232-33.
196 See FISKE, supra note 189, at 236-39.
"n See id. at 19.
'
98 Id. at 310.
199 Hall, supra note 25, at 232-33.
200 HAL FOSTER, RECODINGS: ART, SPECTACLE, CULTURAL POLITICS 170 (1985).
201 d. at 170-71.
202 See Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience "Recoding" Rights, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 805, 810 n.33 (1993) (quoting Foster's RECODINGS: ART, SPECTACLE, CULTURAL
POLITICS as a means to provide greater clarity to the definition of "recoding"); Coombe, supra note 7,
at 1864 n.62 (citing FOSTER, supra, as general support for her view that recoding advances semiotic
democracy).
203 FOSTER, supra note 200, at 170-71.
204 id. at 171.
205 id.
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differences hardly constitutes resistance, as is commonly believed: it
simply means you are a good player, a good consumer."20 6 Capitalism,
then, welcomes recoding, by incorporating and co-opting it-such has
been the fate of nearly every youth subculture based on recoding, from
rock 'n' roll to punk to hip-hop.2 °7
Despite Foster's warning, the U.S. legal academy has recoded both
"semiotic democracy," and "recoding" itself, to conform to liberal-
individualist assumptions. In American intellectual property scholarship,
"semiotic democracy" and "recoding" are used to connote purely
autonomous cultural participation 2° 8 -something Cultural Studies theorists
deemed impossible. Thus, U.S. intellectual property scholars writing in
this vein, like most American followers of Cultural Studies, have largely
ignored the Marxist insights that were fundamental to the original semiotic
democracy theory.2 °9
Recoding can have both positive and negative effects on semiotic
democracy. These potentially conflicting effects are abstract and beyond
empirical measurement; thus, it is impossible to reach a meaningful cost-
benefit calculation of the "net effect., 210 Rather, copyright policy must be
candid about the potential positive and negative effects of law and consider
the kinds of benefits society values categorically-and the kinds of harms
society is willing to tolerate. "Free culture" proponents implicitly accept
formally equal expression and participation rights as a more important
value than correcting power disparities per se. This is hardly unusual-it
is, after all, the heart of liberalism. But it is in considerable tension with
their professed concern for the actual distribution of cultural influence in
society.
B. Subsidizing Recoding, Discouraging Innovation
1. The Static Reification Fallacy
Copyright critics are fond of pointing out that imitation and borrowing
are used in many types of cultural production. Many of them further assert
that hip-hop is particularly dependent on borrowing, 21I and more
206 Id. (emphasis added).
207 Cf Dick Hebdige, The Meaning of Mod, in RESISTANCE THROUGH RITUALS 87, 93-94 (Stuart
Hall & Tony Jefferson eds., 1976) (describing the death of "mod" as a subculture and its assimilation
into popular culture).
208 See supra notes 7-12 (citing Lessig, Coombe, and Madow).
209 See Morley & Chen, supra note 194, at 4-5 (arguing that the American adaptation of Cultural
Studies "has tended to result in the loss of its original political commitments").
210 Cf Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO
ST. L.J. 517, 539-44 (1990) (arguing that a utilitarian evaluation of copyright law is conceptually and
empirically impossible to perform).
211 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 4, at 9 ("Rap music is a genre that is built upon 'ripping' (and,
relatedly, 'sampling') the music of others [and] mixing that music with lyrics or other music.").
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specifically, on borrowing that conflicts with copyright law.212 Thus, they
argue, copyright law threatens semiotic democracy in that it would
discourage new voices-many of them African-American-from
participating in making cultural meanings.23 But this view exemplifies
intellectual property scholars' failure to consider recoding's potential
negative implications for semiotic democracy.
Commentators on any subject tend to essentialize and reify the subject
in order to make it more amenable to analysis.1 4 But any art form, indeed
any complex phenomenon, is multifaceted at any one point in time, as well
as dynamic across time. Stuart Hall criticized the idea that any cultural
form has a "fixed and unchanging meaning or value., 211 Similarly, jazz
historian Ted Gioia has bemoaned the tendency of jazz historians and
critics to employ oversimplified "static models of jazz." 216  Hip-hop has
been subjected to the same kind of essentialization. For example, one of
the leading intellectual-property commentators has argued that both jazz
and hip-hop consist primarily of copying existing works and grafting new
elements onto them. 217  Another prominent commentator has argued that
sampling is the "soul" of hip-hop music. 218 Yet another has asserted that
"the question of whether and how sampling should be permitted is in some
measure an inquiry about how and to what extent hip hop can and should
continue to exist as a musical form." 219 According to Rosemary Coombe,
intellectual property law can stifle certain kinds of creative and critical
practices "[b]y objectifying and reifying cultural forms-freezing the
connotations of signs and symbols.220  Ironically, the argument that
copyright threatens hip-hop is based on a similar "freezing" of music. In
fact, many hip-hop musicians define it by its eclecticism-that is, by its
221
very lack of essential elements.
212 VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 133 ("[C]opyright has been deeply entrenched in the
western literary tradition for centuries, but does not play the same role in African, Caribbean, or
African American oral traditions.").
211 See, e.g., id. at 148 ("Ethnocentric notions of creativity and a maldistribution of political power
in favor of established artists and media companies have already served to stifle expression-the exact
opposite of the declared purpose of copyright law.").
214 See, e.g., Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporation Law,
35 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 779-80 (2002). I admit to essentializing and reifying "free culture" scholarship
in this Article, but the basic gist of the scholars quoted here is remarkably consistent.
215 Hall, supra note 25, at 237.
216 Ted Gioia, The Ghost in the Machine, in THE FUTURE OF JAZZ 189, 192-96 (Yuval Taylor ed.,
2002), quoted in JOHN GENNARI, BLOWIN' HOT AND COOL: JAZZ AND ITS CRITICS 4 (2006).
217 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 9; cf Jazz Has Got Copyright, supra note 58, at 1944 (asserting,
incorrectly, that jazz consists primarily of reinterpretations of pop and Broadway "standards").
218 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 144.
219 Arewa, supra note 10, at 630.
220 Coombe, supra note 7, at 1866.
221 Heimlich, supra note 65 (quoting hip-hop artist DJ Shadow as saying, "[n]o boundaries, no
genre barriers .... That is to me what hip-hop is about").
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Intellectual property commentators tend to portray sampling as an
insurgent and beleaguered form of underground art, and argue that it is
essential to hip-hop. Both of these contentions are questionable. Sampling
is a venerable, ubiquitous, and profitable method of musical production
that is neither necessary to, nor specific to, hip-hop music. 222  One
commentator argues that because clearance requirements (supposedly
created by Grand Upright) allowed copyright holders to deny permission
to "transgressive" sampling, samples in 1990s hip-hop became
"nonthreatening, and too often clumsy and obvious. 223 But like the rest of
the music industry, hip-hop has not required legal pressure to produce
"nonthreatening" and "obvious" pop music. Indeed, as noted above, rap's
first national hit, "Rapper's Delight," and two of its biggest hits, "U Can't
Touch This" and "Ice Ice Baby," borrowed directly and obviously from
other contemporaneous hit songs.224 All of these songs, and many other
similar hybrids, predate Grand Upright. The latter two were
contemporaneous with (and far more popular than) the work of more
experimental and "transgressive" samplers such as Public Enemy, De La
Soul, and the Beastie Boys.
225
Not all sampling appears in hip-hop, and not all hip-hop performances
or recordings use digital samples or other manipulations of copyrighted
recordings. As noted in Part II of this article, sampling in hip-hop has
clear, direct antecedents in earlier pop-music practices. Indeed, many
commentators seem to assume that sampling is inherently innovative, even
as they point out that appropriation is as old as music itself.
226
While the sampling-like work of DJs is an important influence, hip-
hop also has other kinds of musical predecessors, such as the work of
spoken-word artists of the late 1960s and early 1970s, such as Gil-Scott
Heron and the Last Poets. 227 Musicologists trace the deeper roots of rap
back to the oral traditions of West Africa and the rural American South.228
Furthermore, as in any art form, methods and styles vary among
222 Jeff Chang's magisterial history of hip-hop culture, a winner of the American Book Award,
barely mentions sampling (and does not mention the legal issues surrounding sampling at all). See
generally CHANG, supra note 15. In addition, a recent major scholarly work on the art of hip-hop,
published by Yale University Press, focuses entirely on rap lyrics. See THE ANTHOLOGY OF RAP,
supra note 31, at xxxv. Furthermore, hip-hop did not introduce digital sampling to pop music. See
infra note 263 and accompanying text (discussing Trevor Horn's use of the Fairlight synthesizer).
223 VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 143.
224 See supra notes 49-50, 62-66 & 170-71 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 103-115 and accompanying text (describing albums by these artists).
226 See Arewa, supra note 10, at 609-10 (discussing the tradition of borrowing in classical music
and its importance as a source of innovation).
227 See Alec Wilkinson, New York is Killing Me, NEW YORKER, Aug. 9, 2010, at 26, 30 (quoting
rap legend Chuck D as calling Scott-Heron and the Last Poets "the roots of rap").
228 See Cheryl L. Keyes, The Roots and Stylistic Foundations of the Rap Music Tradition, in THE
HiP HOp READER 3,4-8, 10-11 (Tim Strode & Tim Wood eds., 2008).
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practitioners, and are debated among them as well.
From the beginnings of hip-hop music and continuing to the present,
the use of copyrighted recordings has been only one of many technological
tools for producing the instrumental aspects of hip-hop music. As the
influential group Stetsasonic rapped in 1988: "You see, you
misunderstood/ A sample is a tactic/ A portion of my method, a tool/ In
fact it's only of importance when I make it a priority., 2 29 By analogy, jazz
music often uses saxophones and trumpets, but no particular instrument is
considered "essential" technology for the making of jazz. Since the
earliest days of hip-hop, many significant works contained no potentially
infringing samples. For example, two of the most influential early hip-hop
singles, 1982's "The Message" by Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five
and "Looking for the Perfect Beat" by Afrika Bambaataa and Soulsonic
Force, consisted of raps accompanied by original music played on
synthesizers, keyboards, and drum machines. 230  Some hip-hop songs
consist of rap or other vocals with no instrumental accompaniment.
Stetsasonic, the Beastie Boys, and more recently, Grammy-award winning
artists OutKast and the Roots are among the many important hip-hop
groups that both sample and play their own compositions on their own
instruments.2 3'
Many critics of copyright correctly argue that composition often
includes appropriation, and that the line between infringement and
"original" composition is a blurry one.232 But this blurriness is hardly
unusual-the law is full of flexible, context-specific "standards."
Moreover, this particular imperfect distinction has necessarily existed as
long as copyright in music has existed, and it has not crushed semiotic
democracy or musical innovation. As the leading copyright treatise points
out, "almost all works are derivative works in that in some degree they are
229 STETSASONIC, Talkin'All that Jazz, on IN FULL GEAR (Tommy Boy Records, 1988).
230 See Richard Buskin, Afrika Bambaataa and the Soulsonic Force: "Planet Rock," SOUND ON
SOUND (2008), http://www.soundonsound.com/sos/nov08/articles/classictracksl1108.htm (quoting
producer Arthur Baker as saying, "[njothing on that record ["Looking for the Perfect Beat"] was
borrowed from anyone"); Mark Richardson, Review of Grandmaster Flash & The Furious Five, The
Message, PITCHFORK.COM, July 14, 2005, http://pitchfork.com/reviews/albums/11751-the-message-
they-said-it-couldnt-be-done/ (noting the song's "squelchy synth riff').
231 See Kelefa Sanneh, Believe the Hype: Hip-hop and Its Discontents, 80 TRANSITION 120, 123
(1999) (discussing a Stetsasonic song featuring "a live (i.e., nonsampled) synthesizer line"); Kathy
McCabe, Outkast Double the Funk, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sidney, Australia), Dec. 18, 2003, at T12
(discussing a member of Outkast's ability to play clarinet and saxophone); Craig Rosen, Rap in
Evolution: Old School, New Frontiers; Modern Rock Opens Doors to Rap Tracks, BILLBOARD, Jun. 25,
1994, at I (noting the Beastie Boy's transformation from punk band to rap group); Allison Samuels,
Taking Rap Back to Its Real Roots, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 1999, at 68 (reviewing The Roots' album
"Things Fall Apart").
232 See, e.g., Arewa, supra note 10, at 571-72 ("[Ilt is not always clear in music how much
originality is required to make something copyrightable.").
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derived from pre-existing works. 233 It is important to note, however, that
"[a] work is not derivative [in the legal sense] unless it has substantially
copied from a prior work., 234 Indeed, the prevalence of copying in popular
culture does not prove that copyright law threatens pop culture; it proves
just the opposite.235
2. From Innovation to ClichW
Commentators' insistence that sampling remains "innovative,"
"transgressive," or essential to hip-hop is based on a static view of artists'
preferred methods and their meaning within an art form. A dynamic view
appreciates that the meaning of sampling could transform over time. The
mere act of "recoding" pop culture is no longer, by itself, an important or
novel artistic statement (if indeed it ever was). Biz Markie's use of a rap
over a recognizable pop melody in 1991 was basically the same concept
"Rapper's Delight" used in 1979. Danger Mouse's The Grey Album was,
in both sound and technique, reminiscent of earlier hip-hop records, such
as those by Grandmaster Flash and Steinski. Indeed, the central gimmick
of The Grey Album-raps set to tracks constructed from Beatles samples-
was heard fifteen years earlier on the Beastie Boys' aforementioned Paul's
Boutique album.
236
Despite its importance to early hip-hop, many hip-hop artists came to
deride sampling as it became ubiquitous. Beans (Robert Stewart), a
founding member of influential and innovative hip-hop group Anti-Pop
Consortium, has said, "I'm not into sampling much. If you're trying to
bring about tomorrow, don't take sh-t from yesterday., 237 Similarly, Dan
"The Automator" Nakamura, an influential producer and DJ, argued over a
decade ago, "[t]here's no new R&B music out there today, because it's all
stolen from the past., 238 Imani Coppola had a hip-hop influenced pop hit
in 1997 with "Legend of a Cowgirl," which was built around a sample
239from a 1966 pop song. Just a year later, she said, "I am a
233 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01, 3-2 (Matthew
Bender ed., 2011).234 Id. § 3-3.
233 Cf Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77
TEX. L. REV. 923, 947 (1999) (pointing out that much of the recoding in pop music is perfectly
permissible under intellectual property law).
236 The Beastie Boys' song, "The Sounds of Science," was built in part from the Beatles' "The
End" and "Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band (Reprise)." Compare BEASTIE BOYS, PAUL'S
BOUTIQUE (Capitol Records 1989), with THE BEATLES, SGT. PEPPER'S LONELY HEARTS CLUB BAND
(Capitol Records 1967).
237 Ethan Brown, Genre Bender, WIRED, Mar. 2003, at 61, available at http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/i 1.03/play.html?pg-2 (quoting Beans).
238 Thor Christensen, (Old Sounds) New Spin; Rampant Sampling Makes Many in the Music Biz
Wonder Whether Pop's Creativity has Crashed, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Apr. 12, 1998, at IC.
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hypocrite... [b]ut I hate sampling . . .[i]t's gonna be the joke of music
history."
240
As one critic has observed, "[i]n pop [culture], every wave of
innovation... inevitably heralds a host of new clichrs and conventions.,
241
Sampling is now a dominant method of economic production by the
dominant culture industries. Whatever its novelty in the 1970s, the
appropriation of copyrighted music (like other elements of hip-hop sound
and style) has long appeared in all genres of pop music, on television, and
in advertising.
3. The Artistic Benefits of Restrictions
Technical limits have historically presented obstacles for artists to
overcome, resulting in innovations. For example, Public Enemy's
producer Hank Shocklee prefers older digital samplers to today's
computers because the older machines required creative use of limited
242digital memory. As technology frees art from technical and physical
constraints, man-made constraints may help inspire artists to make new
kinds of meanings through new techniques. Restrictive rules, even
somewhat arbitrary ones, can provide this kind of beneficial constraint.243
For example, the "Hays Code," the self-censorship rules the U.S. motion-
picture industry adopted in the 1920s, are sometimes caricatured as stifling
and prudish.244  But film scholars have come to believe that the Code
helped "facilitate the insertion of potentially controversial representations
into motion pictures., 245  Rather than eliminating controversial content,
they argue, it led filmmakers to express such content through creative,
stylized shorthand rather than literal, graphic images.246
Cost can be a type of beneficial restriction, as subsidizing any activity
can lead to the inefficient overutilization of that activity. Subsidizing
sampling may encourage its overuse and reduce incentives to develop other
potential methods of cultural production. Part II above argued that law is
not determinative of cultural practices. Nonetheless, assume for the sake
24 0 Id.
241 SIMON REYNOLDS, Rip IT UP AND START AGAIN: POSTPUNK 1978-1984 270 (2005). Reynolds
argues that punk, like hip-hop, was a genre that quickly mutated from an anything-goes iconoclasm to a
formulaic sound. Id. at xvii. Reynolds argues that Black Flag's 1982 album, Damaged, "was such a
definitive hardcore statement that it served simultaneously to codify the genre [of "hardcore" punk] and
render it nearly obsolete. Id. at 456.
242 Ben Detrick, The Dirty Heartbeat of the Golden Age, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 6, 2007.
24 3 See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND
CONSTRAINTS 1-2, 175-76 (2000).
244 See Norman Rosenberg, Looking for Law in All the Old Traces: The Movies of Classical
Hollywood, the Law, and the Case(s) of Film Noir, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1456 (2001).
245 Id.
246 A familiar example is the use of a fade-to-black following a couple's embrace in order to
imply sexual relations. See id
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of argument that "free culture" theorists are correct that the cost of
copyright permission in the early 1990s discouraged sampling. If so, it
may have contributed to semiotic democracy by inspiring alternatives to
the then-dominant hip-hop approach. According to one hip-hop producer,
legal impediments to sampling simply mean "producers have to 'step up to
the game' and become more creative without using samples. ' 47  The
Beastie Boys, for example, played their own instruments after Paul's
248Boutique.  While one of the band members characterized this shift as an
artistic decision, 249 another musician has attributed it to the cost of sample
clearance. Clearance costs may have also inspired new approaches to
sampling, such as DJ Shadow's use of obscure or unrecognizable samples.
Beck's Odelay and the Beastie Boys' Check Your Head also included
samples of their own instrumental playing.251 M.I.A.'s 2007 hit song,
"Paper Planes," featured a distinctive chorus built on the sampled sounds
of gunshots and a ringing cash register.2 Turntablist DJ Q-bert has stated
that copyright law is "a challenge for us because you really have to flip the
sound .... That's also what makes it more beautiful as well. It makes you
want to change that sound because if you just use it then it's theirs and
that's stealing.,
253
C. Subsidizing the Powerful: Markets and the Limits of Formal Equality
Facilitating recoding (through relaxed clearance requirements or a
compulsory licensing process, for example) might make it easier for the
semiotically weak to participate in cultural production, but would be
unlikely to increase their influence relative to the semiotic establishment-
and it could even decrease it. Lowering the cost of recoding could inhibit
semiotic democracy by subsidizing not only the semiotically weak and
resource-poor, but also the most culturally influential members of
society.254  Given the greater resources and distribution networks of
established media corporations, their recodings are likely to have more
cultural influence than those of less powerful speakers.
247 Susan Butler, Court Ruling Could Chill Sample Use, BILLBOARD, Sept. 18, 2004.
248 See COLEMAN, supra note 103, at 17, 20-21.
249 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
250See COLEMAN, supra note 103, at 17 (quoting musician Money Mark, who contributed to
Check Your Head, as saying, "[t]he way I always heard it was that [the Beastie Boys'] accountant told
them that they couldn't make any money with all those samples, so they tried a different route").
251 COLEMAN, supra note 103, at 17, 20-22; NEVIN MARTELL, BECK: THE ART OF MUTATION 40
(2001).
252 M.I.A., Paper Planes, on KALA (XL Records/Interscope Records 2007).
2 53 
KEMBREW MCLEOD, OWNING CULTURE: AUTHORSHIP, OWNERSHIP, AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 95 (2001).
254 See Madow, supra note 1, at 240 (citing JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE,
THE VOICE, AND THE LAW 115 (1991)).
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The use of sampling in hip-hop plays an important role in the discourse
about recoding and semiotic democracy because hip-hop is often viewed as
the paradigm of a "minority discourse," in terms of race, class, politics, and
artistic values. 255  As a "minority discourse," it is simultaneously
essentialized as inherently oppositional to "mainstream" law and culture.
But hip-hop is not a pure cultural underdog. Like much of American pop
culture, it has deep African-American roots, and much of hip-hop music
has nominally oppositional content. But much of it-and certainly most of
that which attracts the attention of the law-is also a commercial product
sold by multinational corporations.2 5 6 It can be, in hip-hop parlance, both
the player and the played--often simultaneously. As music critic Robert
Christgau wrote as early as 1986, "to fuss about the exploitation of hip-hop
is quite often to take sides against the hip-hoppers themselves. 257
As one scholar has argued, academic commentary tends to focus on
"general societal (i.e., social, political, and economic) conditions that made
hip-hop an attractive proposition for inner-city youth, 258 and has failed to
consider the influence of technology and artists' "specific aesthetic
goals., 259 Thus, commentators often assert that turntables and samplers
spread semiotic democracy because they are affordable and do not require
musical training.260 The suggestion that sampling is socioeconomically
determined and easy to do-rather than a conscious, sophisticated artistic
choice-implicitly denies hip-hop the status of "art" and denies its
practitioners the status of "artists." Furthermore, it perpetuates stereotypes
of African-Americans as poor and uneducated.
In fact, not only were pioneering hip-hop artists highly creative, many
of them came from educated, middle-class and upper-middle class
backgrounds.26' In addition, the belief that sampling first emerged as a
cheaper and easier alternative to traditional music-making is more myth
than fact. Hip-hop DJing may have originated in the housing projects of
the Bronx, but the turntables, mixers, amplifiers and record collections of
hip-hop DJs were not affordable, everyday items: they were the specialized
255 See SCHLOSS, supra note 47, at 17; Greene, supra note 97, at 383 (referring to rap music as
"one of today's primary Black art forms").
256 Cf CHANG, supra note 15, at 447 ("At the turn of the century, the hip-hop generation was now
at the center of a global capitalist process generating billions of dollars in revenues.").
257 Id. at 407 (quoting Robert Christgau, in 1986).
258 SCHLOSS, supra note 47, at 17.
259 Id. at 2.
260 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 182, at 30; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 138; see also
LESSIG, supra note 4, at 270 n.10 (citing VAIDHYANATHAN).
261 Run DMC, LL Cool J, and Russell Simmons, co-founder of the influential Def Jam label, are
from middle-class neighborhoods in Queens, New York. CHANG, supra note 15, at 231. The members
of Public Enemy, De La Soul, and Rick Rubin (co-founder of Def Jam) are from prosperous parts of
Long Island; some of the members of Public Enemy met as college students. Id. Note also that
important hip-hop pioneers such as the Beastie Boys, Rick Rubin, and Steve Stein were not black.
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262(and expensive) tools of professional entertainers. Digital sampling was
introduced into popular music by established, professional music
producers, and not by a grassroots artistic movement.263 Digital sampling
equipment, like any other cutting-edge technology, was extremely
expensive and difficult to use when it first appeared: the pioneering
Fairlight sampling synthesizers originally cost between $50,000 and
$1 0 0 ,0 0 0 .264 Even today, a professional-quality digital sampler and the
computer equipment required to manipulate samples can cost thousands of
dollars.265  Sampling may have expanded the toolbox of music
professionals, but it did not necessarily make musicianship more broadly
accessible. The suggestion that music-making was closed to the poor or
untrained until the advent of sampling technology is an odd one: whether
garage rockers or "folk" musicians, untrained musicians have always made
compelling music with inexpensive or homemade instruments.
Whatever its benefits in terms of efficient production, reducing the cost
of appropriation could potentially have negative distributional effects in
terms of both wealth and semiotic influence, as it would subsidize wealthy
and powerful artists and record labels, as well as the less influential.
Rosemary Coombe argued that recoding requires protection because it
implicates the "quintessentially human . .. capacity to make meaning,
challenge meaning, and transform meaning . . .., But when a
multinational corporation recodes the work of a relatively powerless
individual, recoding can pose a threat to human self-realization.
Although hip-hop music and sampling continue to exist in
independent, less commercial forms, commercially successful music is
more likely to appear as the subject of litigation or legislative reform
because it implicates large amounts of money. Commercially successful
recordings embody a contradiction in that they offer artists a platform for
262 See CHANG, supra note 15, at 68-69 (describing the extensive equipment used by Kool Herc
and his father, Keith Campbell, the sound engineer for a rhythm-and-blues band); see also LLOYD
BRADLEY, BASS CULTURE 36-37, 141-42 (2000) (arguing that the importance of amplification
technology to Jamaican DJs influenced hip-hop through Jamaican immigrants like the Campbells).
263 Digital sampling appears to have been introduced into commercially recorded pop music in
1983 when the British record producer Trevor Horn produced the song "Beat Box" for The Art of
Noise. Horn was formerly a member of the 1970s rock groups The Buggies and Yes. See REYNOLDS,
supra note 241. "Beat Box," which was built around a sampled and looped drum break, influenced
hip-hop when it became a favorite of break dancers. Id. The first use of digital sampling in a rap
record appears to have been Marley Marl's production of MC Shan's "The Bridge" in 1986. See
CHANG, supra note 15, at 256.
264 Fairlight Instruments, History (andfuture), FAIRLIGHTINSTRUMENTS.COM,
http://www.fairlightinstruments.com/history.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2011); see also CHANG, supra
note 15, at 256 (describing early Fairlights as "prohibitively expensive").
265 Vaidhyanathan inadvertently attests to the cost of digital sampling when he states, apparently
without irony, that "[a]li a young composer needed was a thick stack of vinyl albums, a $2000 sampler,
a microphone, and a tape deck." VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 138 (emphasis added).
266 Coombe, supra note 7, at 1879.
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semiotic influence, but ultimately increase the semiotic influence (and
wealth) of record companies (which, in the case of the most successful
recordings, tend to be multinationals). The pioneering DJ Afrika
Bambaataa claims to have turned away inquiries from record labels for
some time before eventually becoming a recording artist, because he feared
recordings would reduce attendance at his successful live shows-that is,
that they would transfer the value of his labor from himself to a record
label.267 Subsidizing recoding can exacerbate this regressive redistribution
of wealth. As the Sixth Circuit noted in Bridgeport, samples are valuable
to music producers because they offer a way to obtain the sound of a
268musician without employing any musicians. In this way, sampling
shares much in common with automated production methods in other
industries.
"Rapper's Delight" embodies the contradictions of commercially
successful hip-hop records. On the one hand, it was the debut of a group
of unknown performers, released by a small, black-owned, independent
record label, and gave hip-hop music its first worldwide exposure. On the
other hand, it can be blamed for transforming a participatory underground
cultural movement into a watered-down and passively consumed
commercial product.269 Even in its day, the record was derided by many
hip-hop artists and fans as a weak commercial imitation of hip-hop
culture.27° At the time, live hip-hop was well established in the Bronx and
in the downtown Manhattan art scene. Many hip-hoppers thought the very
idea of recordings absurd, however, because hip-hop was not a type of
music so much as an interactive live experience. 271 The owner of Sugarhill
Records, Sylvia Robinson, assembled the Sugarhill Gang for the express
purpose of capitalizing on the genre. Robinson, who was from New
Jersey, did not consider herself part of the "Bronx-centered hip-hop
subculture"-by her own admission, she "didn't know no Bronx
people. 2 72 Thus she manufactured a group, one of whose members was
Hank Jackson, a pizza parlor employee. Unbeknownst to Robinson,
Jackson happened to manage a hip-hop group called the Cold Crush
267 Daly, supra note 49, at 250 (quoting Bambaataa as saying "[n]obody would want to buy a
record when they can come to a party and see it.... We thought that (records) would be the demise of
our parties").
268 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801-02, 802 n. 14 (6th Cir. 2005).
269 See CHANG, supra note 15, at 132 (arguing that after the release of Rapper's Delight, "club-
going turned into a more passive experience than ever" because patrons came to watch performers
onstage rather than to dance).
270 See id. at 129-34 (discussing how "Rapper's Delight" was viewed as a "sham" because it
"turned hip-hop into popular music" in order to "fit the standards of the music industry"); see also
Daly, supra note 49, at 250 ("In the South Bronx, the Sugarhill Gang were regarded as underqualified
ambassadors for a movement fully evolved and happily autonomous.").
271 See CHANG, supra note 15, at 130, 132 (quoting Chuck D, and filmmaker Charlie Aheam).
272 Daly, supra note 49, at 250.
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Brothers, established local performers who had not yet made any
commercial recordings.273 Jackson allegedly plagiarized some of the lyrics
on "Rapper's Delight" from raps written by one of the Cold Crush
Brothers.274
Similar contradictions arise from the fact that sampling in hip-hop
often involves established musicians and multinational record labels
appropriating the work of less popular and powerful artists.275 Funkadelic,
the group whose work, sampled by NWA, was at the heart of Bridgeport v.
Dimension Films,276 enjoyed far less commercial success than either NWA
or Dimension Films-the studio that used the NWA song in a film. 277 The
work of drummer Clyde Stubblefield (particularly on the James Brown
song, "Funky Drummer") is sampled ubiquitously in hip-hop and other
popular music, yet he does not receive royalties.278 Similarly, the "Amen
Break," a drum passage from an obscure funk record has been heavily
sampled in hip-hop and in "drum and bass" dance music. 279 Neither the
original artists nor their record label appear to have received any royalties
from that lucrative sample.28° In Newton v. Diamond,28' the Beastie Boys
used a sample without the permission of composer James Newton. While
Newton is an established and respected musician, his cultural influence
cannot compare to that of a major pop group like the Beastie Boys and
their multinational record label. Given the tendency to essentialize hip-hop
as an African-American form, it also bears mentioning that the Beastie
273 Id.
274 Id. (quoting Grandmaster Caz, a member of the Cold Crush Brothers). Jackson has denied
plagiarizing from Grandmaster Caz and claims he was Caz's writing partner, but a journalist who wrote
about the issue stated that Jackson's claims are "not supported by any one of the many prominent hip-
hop figures interviewed for this story." Id.
275 Similarly, some major rock stars and record labels plagiarized from relatively obscure blues
artists, who sued and obtained favorable settlements. See, e.g., DAVE LEWIS, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO
THE MUSIC OF LED ZEPPELIN 14 (1994); Michael Goldberg, Willie Dixon Sues Led Zeppelin Over
"Whole Lotta Love," ROLLING STONE, Mar. 14, 1985, at 12. Although some commentators argue that
blues music is communally authored and antithetical to intellectual property ownership, see
VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 123-26, these blues artists asserted their intellectual property
rights to claim authorship and fight back against economic exploitation.
276 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
2 The film, "I Got the Hook Up," cost an estimated $3.5 million to make and grossed over $10
million at the box office. The Internet Movie Database, Box Office and Business for "I Got the Hook
Up, " IMDB.coM, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0131436/business (last visited Sept. 8, 2011).
278 See, e.g., Rob Thomas, Is Sampling an Art Form or "Incredibly Lazy" Theft? THE CAPITAL
TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Jan. 28, 2010, at 15.
279 See Steve Collins, Amen to That, M/C JOURNAL, May 2007, http://www.joumal.media-
culture.org.au/0705/09-collins.php; Nathan Harrison, Can I Get an Amen?, http://nkhstudio.com/pages/
popupamen.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2011) (sound recording from an audio installation dated 2004).
280 Danuta Kean, The Amen Break, ALC NEWS (Spring 2011), http://www.alcs.co.uk/news/
amenbreak.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2011) ("Gregory C Colemen and Winstone's frontman Richard
L Spencer, the copyright holder of Amen, Brother, have not seen a penny.").
28' 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see discussion supra Section II.B.2.
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Boys are white and James Newton is African-American.
The potential harm of compulsory licensing goes beyond regressive
economic redistribution. It can also subsidize efforts of the semiotically
influential to seize control over and subvert semiotic projects of the less
powerful. At the time of Grand Upright, Biz Markie's work was
distributed by Warner Brothers, while Gilbert O'Sullivan had not had a hit
record in years. O'Sullivan testified that he did not want Biz Markie to use
"Alone Again (Naturally)" because Biz Markie had a reputation as a comic
282performer. Despite a deceptively pretty pop melody, the O'Sullivan
song's lyrics are grim, written from the point of view of a man
contemplating suicide. 83 O'Sullivan stated that he is extremely protective
of the song's serious content, and has refused to license it for any
humorous uses, or even for karaoke.284
Chuck D, the Public Enemy rapper who has complained about having
to pay for sample clearances, 285 has himself filed two copyright-
infringement suits on the recoding of his work. His voice was sampled in a
St. Ides malt liquor commercial and in a rap song by the Notorious B.I.G.
that allegedly glorified drug dealing.286 At the time of the suit in the late
1990s, Public Enemy's commercial and cultural influence had significantly
declined, while B.I.G., although recently deceased, was a major rap star.28 7
Chuck D complained that the uses were both infringing and defamatory
because they associated his voice with inner-city scourges that he has
specifically criticized in his music. 288 In particular, the song about drug
dealing sampled a song that Chuck D claimed was actually "about
empowering young black persons through peaceful, non-violent and non-
drug using means. 289
Rock music provides a related example. While campaigning for re-
election in 1984, Ronald Reagan claimed to admire Bruce Springsteen's
songs for their "message of hope., 290 Reagan's comment appeared to be a
282 See Nov. 25 Hearing, supra note 68, at 20.
293 The lyrics, which are included as an exhibit in the Grand Upright case file, see supra note 68,
include such lines as "God in his mercy, who if he really does exist/why did he desert me in my hour of
need?" The song ends by describing the deaths of the narrator's parents.
284 See Nov. 25 Hearing, supra note 68, at 20.
285 See supra notes 114 and accompanying text (citing Caught-Can We Get a Witness?).
286 See Reiss, supra note 115.
287 See George Ciccariello-Maher, Public Enemy, in 1 ICONS OF Hip Hop: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE MOVEMENT, MUSIC, AND CULTURE 169, 183 (Mickey Hess ed., 2007) (discussing the decline of
Public Enemy as a significant force in rap as a result of the group losing "one of its central ingredients
by 1990"); Rapper's Posthumous CD Tops the Chart, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1997, at C16 (stating that
retailers knew that Notorious B.I.G.'s posthumous CD was a "smash" the day the CD went on sale).
288 See Reiss, supra note 115.
289 id.
290 Francis X. Clines, President Heaps Praise on Voters in the Northeast, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1984, at B20.
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reference to Springsteen's song, "Born in the U.S.A., 2 9 ' That song is often
misinterpreted as a patriotic or even jingoistic anthem, although its lyrics
are actually about the indignities suffered by a Vietnam veteran in a
declining and unsympathetic America.292  In response to Reagan's
comments, Springsteen questioned whether the President had actually
listened to his music. 293 Nonetheless, Reagan's campaign reportedly asked
Springsteen to provide an endorsement; Springsteen declined. 294  The
campaign also reportedly asked the same of Michael Jackson, who also
declined, citing a conflict with his religious beliefs as a Jehovah's
Witness.295 Under a compulsory licensing regime, Reagan could have used
"Born in the U.S.A." or a Michael Jackson song without permission. The
minority political and religious views of these artists could have been
replaced by associations with Reagan and Reaganism. This hypothetical
scenario becomes even more disturbing if we imagine a president who
perceived the dark theme of Springsteen's song as politically threatening,
and appropriated it specifically in order to "recode" it as a "message of
hope."
Compulsory licensing for uses such as those cited here could obviously
facilitate expression.296  Because it would empower the culturally
influential, however, it would not necessarily foster semiotic democracy.
This proposition is distinct from the argument that an artist has a "moral
right" to control her message. Individual listeners are, and should be, free
to reinterpret "Born in the U.S.A." in any number of ways, including as a
"message of hope." Indeed, many, if not most, listeners seem to have done
so, and have succeeded in changing the cultural meaning of the song.297
Similarly, they could choose to hear the dark and plaintive "Alone Again
(Naturally)" as a wistful rumination on loneliness. Such recodings could
be seen as examples of the public resisting and remaking messages
produced by the media industry.
But recoding by incumbent politicians, major record labels, and
similarly influential parties has an altogether different impact on semiotic
democracy. Subsidizing such recodings would help those powerful
interests reinterpret, and even "drown out" a less powerful artist's attempt
291 Jim Miller, Pop and Jazz, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 1984, at 93.
292 id.
293 See Reagan's New Hero, 16 NAT'L J. 1807, 1807 (1984).
294 See Rock Stars Reject GOP's Overtures, ADWEEK, Oct. 29, 1984.
29 5 id.
296 See, e.g., Kurt Opsahl, Henley v. Devore: Second-Class Citizenship for Satire?, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (June 24, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/06/henley-v-devore-second-
class-citizenship-satire.
297 Radio personality Glenn Beck, for example, did not discover the intended meaning of
Springsteen's 1984 song until 2010, when he denounced the song on the air. Jason Linkins, Glenn
Beck Finally Gets Around to Denouncing Bruce Springsteen, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/12/glenn-beck-finally-gets-a-n_497360.html.
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to make meaning.298 As Stuart Hall argued, dominant cultural institutions
may lack the power to brainwash the public, but they do have
disproportionate ability to influence cultural meanings by selecting and
repeating the representations that the public sees. 299  The metaphor of
alternative meanings competing in a "marketplace of ideas" is
inapposite. °° In the cultural context, as in the political and economic
contexts, formally equal opportunity to participate does not necessarily
lead to equality of influence, and can, in fact, exacerbate power
imbalances. Similar criticism has been leveled at the recent Citizens
United3°1 decision, in which the United States Supreme Court invoked the
"marketplace of ideas" metaphor 30 2  to hold that corporate political
contributions could not be regulated more stringently than individuals'
contributions.30 3 Concentration of market share and resources create a
situation ripe for market failure, as well as anticompetitive behavior. The
contestation of meanings would hardly be a fair competition, or even a
meaningful dialogue.
Consider, for example, The Grey Album. Even if intellectual property
law had protected Danger Mouse against EMI's pressure to withdraw the
album, he never stood a serious chance of contesting the cultural meaning
of the Beatles' The White Album or Jay Z's The Black Album. The Beatles
and Jay-Z enjoy the promotional resources, brand recognition, and
298 Cf Madow, supra note 1, at 240 (asserting that if celebrities no longer controlled their
likenesses under intellectual property law, "it is not only popular cultural practice that would be
liberated" because large corporate actors would be "set free to 'graze' on the celebrity commons")
(citing JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW 115 (1991)).
Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc. is another example of this process. 920 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). In that case an architecture theorist successfully sued a movie studio for a film set that closely
copied his copyrighted drawing. Id at 64. "Free culture" advocates have ridiculed the decision as an
example of copyright excess and a threat to semiotic democracy, see LESSIG, supra note 4, at 4;
VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 115, although the plaintiff was a relatively obscure academic and
the defendant was a major movie studio that had admittedly copied his work. Woods, 920 F. Supp. at
63.
299 See Hall, supra note 25, at 232-33 (arguing that dominant cultural institutions "have the
power.., by repetition and selection, to impose and implant such definitions of ourselves as fit more
easily the descriptions of the dominant or preferred culture").
30 Cf Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1641, 1641 (1967) ("[flf ever there were a self-operating marketplace of ideas, it has long ceased to
exist. The mass media's development of an antipathy to ideas requires legal intervention if novel and
unpopular ideas are to be assured a forum ... ").
301 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
302 Id. at 906.
'0' Compare id. at 905 ("All speakers ... use money amassed from the economic marketplace to
fund their speech, and the First Amendment protects the resulting speech."), with Ronald Dworkin, The
Decision that Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 13, 2010, at 63 ("If corporations exercise
the power that the Court has now given them, and buy an extremely large share of the television time
available for political ads, their electioneering will undermine rather than improve the public's political
education.").
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distributional reach of multinational record companies, which gives them
visibility in physical retail outlets, online stores, and traditional media,
such as radio and television, that most independent releases lack.
New, "free" markets are no solution to concentration in existing
markets. Many students of cyberspace believe that because the Internet
facilitates low-cost worldwide distribution, content providers now compete
on equal footing.304 But traditional distribution and marketing channels,
such as radio, concerts, television, movies, and the distribution of CDs in
physical stores, remain important,3 °5 and all of them are dominated by a
relatively few multinational corporations. These sectors have high barriers
to entry and immense concentration.30 6 Following several rounds of
consolidation, sales of recorded music are dominated by four multinational
corporations: Sony/BMG, Universal, Warner, and EMI.3 °7 CC Media
Holdings, through its Clear Channel Radio subsidiary, owns over 150 U.S.
radio stations, 140 radio stations in Australia and New Zealand, and
Premiere Radio, the largest radio network in the United States.30 8 Online
music service Pandora reaches about thirteen to twenty million listeners
per month-but traditional radio reaches about one hundred times as
many.309 Live performance, perhaps the most profitable aspect of the
music industry, is now dominated by a single corporation, thanks to the
2009 merger of Live Nation, the world's largest concert promoter and
venue operator, and Ticketmaster, which dominates both artist-
management and ticket sales.31°
304 See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 119 ("Something has entered the field in a way that could make
these concentrations change... [it is] the architecture of the Internet .... ); see also id (arguing that,
due to the Internet, "the success of any particular kind of content is more convincingly a function of the
desire for that content").
305 See Laurence Green, Social Media and TV Need not be Enemies, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
(London), Aug. 28, 2011, (Business) at 8 ("A typical Briton ... spends 118 hours watching TV each
month and just 3.3 hours on social networks."); John Pareles, Songs From the Heart of a Marketing
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at ARI; see also Brian Stelter & Tanzina Vega, Ad Money Reliably
Goes to Television, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at B1 ("[T]elevision is a tried and true medium for
advertisers, remaining at or near historical highs in the United States.").
306 See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 117 (discussing how twenty-three corporations control most of the
business in the radio, magazine, newspapers, and film sectors).
307 Eric Pfanner, For New Revenue, Sony and Other Labels Reach Far Beyond The Music
Business, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2010, at B5. The constant threat of corporate takeover may also limit
companies' willingness to take risks with new music or the development of new artists. Mike Wiser,
Frequently Asked Questions, PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
music/inside/faqs.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2011); see also Andre Schiffrin, When We Devoured
Books, in CONSUMING DESIRES 111, 116-17 (Roger Rosenblatt ed., 1999) (asserting a similar effect
due to consolidation in the book-publishing industry).
308 Clear Channel Communications, Inc. Fact Sheet, CLEAR CHANNEL,
http://www.clearchannel.com/Corporate/PressRelease.aspx?PressReleaselD= 1564&p-hidden (last
visited Aug. 25, 2011).
309 See Antony Bruno, Pandora: Thinking Outside the Box, BILLBOARD, July 17, 2010.
30 Ray Waddell, Building the Perfect Beast, BILLBOARD, Feb. 6, 2010.
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Formal equality can do little to reduce the concentration of cultural
power unless this real-space oligopoly is addressed,31' whether by antitrust
law, technological innovations, or structural changes.31 2 The Internet is not
a panacea, because powerful members of the culture industry can import
their greater resources and other real-space advantages into cyberspace.
31 3
Public Enemy encountered this reality after it abandoned its record-label
contract in the 1990s and began selling its music directly over the Internet.
According to Chuck D, the group has had to seek new methods of
generating revenue because "we recognized the majors and corporate
gluttons would slowly pour into the digital territory and try to dominate
with analog tactics.
' 314
Although many theorists portray equal, free access as an inherent
aspect of the Internet, Internet access is, in fact, subject to private
gatekeepers such as commercial Internet service providers (ISPs), search
engines, and others.315  In cyberspace, as in real space, money buys
superior access, and thus equality on the Internet seems dependent on
regulation. A federal appeals court recently ruled, however, that the FCC
lacks jurisdiction to require ISPs to observe "net neutrality, 316 and
Congress has so far been unable to pass legislation on the matter. Even if
it were to become law, however, net neutrality provides only for formal
equality of access to the Internet. By itself, it cannot make up for structural
inequalities, such as access to capital, market share, and television
exposure, that increase the cultural clout of established media
organizations.
Of course, copyright protection can impede some semiotically
disempowered persons' attempts to exercise semiotic power. In the
examples above, however, it did not. These anecdotes do not prove that
311 Lessig, however, rejects a direct, antitrust-based response to media concentration. See LESSIG,
supra note 4, at 117-19 ("There are important efficiencies to be gained by the mergers of large media
interests. . . . The government has loosened its restrictions on concentration, sometimes for good
economic reasons ... ").
112 TV, radio, and the like may eventually become outmoded, reducing the media oligopoly's
advantages; however, this is unlikely in the immediate future. Moreover, by that time, traditional
media companies may have successfully leveraged their current advantages into dominant positions in
cyberspace.
313 See, e.g., Stelter & Vega, supra note 305 (arguing that television networks and other media
companies "are getting better at taking their content and monetizing it beyond television" through
Internet distribution and other means) (internal quotations omitted).
314 Gail Mitchell, Public Enemy: Q&A with Chuck D, BILLBOARD, Mar. 20, 2010 (internal
quotations omitted).
315 See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unmediated
Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 697, 702 (2010).
316 See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 648-49 (D.C. Cir. 2010). "Net neutrality means
simply that all like Internet content must be treated alike and move at the same speed over the
network." Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, WASH, POST, June 8,
2006, at A23.
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copyright protection is (or is not) good for semiotic democracy. But they
do show that it can have both positive and negative effects such that its net
effect is unknown-and probably unknowable. There is a fundamental
tension between offering formally equal opportunity of (or subsidy of)
expression and actually broadening the range of people who engage in
meaningful semiotic participation. This Article takes no position on
whether strong, formally equal opportunity to speak should take
categorical precedence over broadening actual participation. But it is
critical to recognize that these are different policy concerns-indeed, they
are different conceptions of "democracy."
D. Recoding as Both Resistance and Capitulation
As the preceding discussion shows, a formally equal regime that is
permissive of recoding can end up subsidizing the semiotically powerful as
well as the weak, so its net effect on semiotic democracy is unclear. One
response to this problem might be an asymmetrical regime that subsidizes
appropriation by the semiotically disempowered from the semiotically
powerful, but not vice versa. The important work of Madhavi Sunder and
Anupam Chander suggests such an approach. For example, they are
advocates of "fan fiction," amateur works that recode characters and
scenarios from copyrighted pop-culture sources, 317 but they also criticize
the appropriation of indigenous cultural knowledge by multinational
corporations."' An asymmetrical approach might allow independent
musicians to sample from major-label recordings but not vice versa.
Asymmetrical access to intellectual property might address issues of
wealth distribution. It would not necessarily advance semiotic democracy,
however, and it might even retard it. In his seminal work on the right of
publicity, Michael Madow argued that the law must choose between strict
protection of celebrity images and other intellectual property, which will
"strengthen the already potent grip of the culture industries over the
production and circulation of meaning," and a more permissive approach,
which will "facilitate popular participation, including participation by
subordinate and marginalized groups, in the processes by which meaning is
made and communicated., 319  The reality, however, is probably
considerably more complicated. Subsidizing the semiotically weak in their
317 See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone's a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of
"Mary Sue "Fan Fiction Fair Use, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 597,599 (2007).
318 See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L.
REv. 1331, 1335 (2004). In a forthcoming article, Sunder suggests that the existing intellectual
property regime exhibits an unfair reverse asymmetricality: Hollywood studios seek legal action
against intellectual-property "piracy" in Asia, yet Hollywood appropriates from Asian film and
television with impunity. See Madhavi Sunder, Bollywood/Hollywood, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN
L. 275,285-87 (2011).
319 Madow, supra note 1, at 141-42.
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use of the cultural commodities of the semiotically powerful may transfer
wealth from the strong to the weak, at least in the short term. Regardless
of its immediate economic effects, however, such borrowing may
contribute to the semiotic dominance of the strong. Recoding can express
resistance and thereby create new meanings, but at the very same time, the
act of appropriating dominant cultural properties (even in order to critique
them) acknowledges their cultural authority and can even further it.320
The argument that recoding, including critical recoding, can contribute
to media domination does not depend on the Frankfurt School thesis that
the media audience is entirely manipulated. Individuals often make
choices that are rational in isolation, but which generate negative
externalities that cumulate into socially negative results. Classic examples
of this dynamic include traffic jams, pollution, and bank runs, in which
individuals' rational, self-interested choices combine to the ultimate
detriment of nearly all the individuals involved.321 Similarly, even
assuming that individuals freely and rationally choose to engage in isolated
acts of recoding, the prevalence of recoding in the culture can result in
reinforcing already dominant cultural institutions.
Many commentators who believe the law should facilitate recoding
argue that it is a form of "collaborative" authorship.322 By its very terms,
this argument acknowledges that both the recoder and the author of the
source material participate in the creation of the new work. Legal
academics tend to see this glass as half-full, in that the recoder is
performing some meaning-making function-but it is also half-empty.
Even the most active engagements with texts, such as the production of
innovative derivative works, involve at least some ceding of the meaning-
making function to the author of the source work. By definition, a recoder
creates some new elements, but also chooses not to create others.
Pioneering hip-hop DJs like Afrika Bambaataa, for example, were
recognized for their eclectic combinations of unusual and obscure
records.323 But even the most creative DJ or sampler cedes some of the
meaning-making function to the creators of the records he plays or
samples. The active, meaning-making aspect of recoding is often
overstated. As Foster said of "postmodern" appropriation in the visual arts
some twenty-five years ago, "many artists borrow promiscuously from
320 See supra notes 200-07 and accompanying text (describing Hal Foster's argument that
recoding is not resistance to capitalism and its ideologies, but exemplary of them).
321 See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms:
Commodifying California's Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1243-45 (2000).
322 See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective
Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 295 (1992); Martha Woodmansee, On the Author
Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 279-82 (1992); Aoki, supra note
202, at 814.
323 See Daly, supra note 49.
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both historical and modem art. But these references rarely engage the
source-let alone the present-deeply.,
324
Appropriation for the purpose of engaging and critiquing the source
presents a special justification for compulsory licensing. An excessively
strong property rule could inhibit semiotic democracy by preventing the
use of recoding to express dissent. Existing doctrine accounts for this to
some extent: the Supreme Court has held that parody of the original
militates in favor of a fair use defense. 325 More recent decisions, however,
seem to expand fair use significantly beyond recodings that engage and
challenge their source material. For example, a recent district court
decision found fair use in a rap song that "highlights the contrast between
the two worldviews [of the source and of the rapper] and expresses the
rapper's belief in the realism of his own perspective. 326  The song in
question adapted the song "What a Wonderful World" by altering the
lyrics to celebrate marijuana use.327 Even more recently, the Second
Circuit stated that fair use protection may extend to works that "satirize
life."
328
When recoding does challenge and critique its source, it may empower
the recoder on one level, but it can simultaneously disempower her on
another level. John Fiske argued that television's semiotic plasticity gives
the disempowered the "pleasure" of engaging in resistance to power
through recoding,329 but acknowledged that "[t]he resistive readings and
pleasures of television do not translate directly into oppositional politics or
324 FOSTER, supra note 200, at 16; cf Hughes, supra note 235, at 946-47 ("[It is important to
understand better what constitutes recoding because it is possible that there actually is little recoding
going on.").
325 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (2004).
326 Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 89-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
see also Bourne Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 602 F. Supp. 2d 499, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(following Abilene and finding that parodists can claim fair use).
Unfortunately, fair use remains a loosely defined, equitable balancing doctrine, and establishing it
in court is costly. When the musical group Negativland and its record label, SST, were sued for
sampling a song by the rock group U2, Negativland insisted that its sample constituted fair use. See
NEGATIVLAND, FAIR USE: THE STORY OF THE LETTER U AND THE NUMERAL 2 23 (1995) (reproducing
an original Negativland press release dated November 10, 1991). Despite this belief, SST and
Negativland could not pay the costs of defending against a lawsuit. See id. at 21, 24. Blanket
protection for recoding seems an excessive response to the cost of copyright litigation, however; after
all, that cost is endemic to our legal system and not particular to copyright. As in other areas of law,
the cost of litigation is addressed in limited part by pro bono organizations, such as the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, the Stanford Law School Center for Interet and Society, and cyberlaw clinics at
law schools. See id. at 21-22.327 Abilene Music, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 90.
328 See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that "the broad principles of
Campbell are not limited to cases involving parody"); see also Lennon v. Premise Media Corp. L.P.,
556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Blanch and finding fair use in the use of John
Lennon's song "Imagine" to criticize anti-religious sentiment generally).
329 See FISKE, supra note 189, at 19.
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social action., 3 0  Indeed, the pleasure of recoding can, like bread and
circuses, mask the pain of subordination and diminish the incentive to
agitate for material change. For example, using sampling to deconstruct
and critique a pop record may express frustration with the record industry,
but this cathartic activity is a poor substitute for material reform of
semiotic democracy, such as reducing the overconcentration in the
industry.
Cultural products are not empty vessels that can be filled with any
preferred meaning. Any source has a range of possible meanings-but not
an infinite range.33 1 Just as irony is often lost on its audience, a critical
recoding may be mistaken for an endorsement or homage. The audience
may even "re-recode" a critical recoding to restore the source's
conventional meaning. As noted above, Bruce Springsteen tried to give
the jingoistic-sounding phrase "Born in the U.S.A." a layered and ironic
meaning, yet many of his listeners insisted on "re-recoding" it to fit its
more conventional meaning.
Similarly, recoding cultural products such as copyrighted commercial
music faces intractable meanings. One of those meanings is the very
centrality of the media as a topic of concern. The very act of manipulating
and commenting on the media, even to criticize it, acts out and furthers its
cultural importance. 332  Insisting that we need corporate-created cultural
commodities to express ourselves not only concedes that those
commodities dominate our culture, but also, and moreover, further
contributes to that domination. This turns John Fiske's vision of semiotic
democracy on its head: while Fiske saw television as liberating because it
lacked cultural authority, today's advocates of "free culture" argue that
cultural appropriation borrowing is necessary precisely because of
330 Id. at 326. Fiske did acknowledge, however, that resistive readings could indirectly contribute
to political change by fostering ideological diversity. Id.
33 As Stuart Hall argued, the members of the culture industry "do have the power constantly to
rework and reshape what they represent; and, by repetition and selection, to impose and implant such
definitions of ourselves as fit more easily the descriptions of the dominant or preferred culture." Hall,
supra note 25, at 232-33; cf MORTON HORWiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-
1960 106 (1994) (arguing that a legal theory in any particular historical context carries "legal and
intellectual baggage" that constrains its range of possible meanings).
332 Negativland, which satirizes the media through the manipulation of samples, has also been
accused of falling into this trap. When Negativland and its label, SST, were sued for unauthorized
sampling, the label and the group had an acrimonious falling out. See NEGATIVLAND, supra note 326
at 51 (reprinting an SST press release dated Feb. 3, 1992). Greg Ginn, the head of SST, argued that
Negativland failed to appreciate the real material impact of the suit and failed to cooperate with SST's
lawyers. Id. at 52. Ginn accused them of treating the incident like another media-based "joke" and
called Negativland "victims of the media cocoon that they frequently lampoon." Id. at 51-52. He also
stated "I suggest Negativland take a year or two off from their ... media obsessions ... to see how the
other side lives." Id. at 50-52.
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commercial pop culture's cultural authority. 333
Recoding popular music can also perpetuate pop music's inherently
commercial, consumerist message; recoding pop music into new pop music
doubles the effect. Regardless of the artist's intended meaning, the
commercial nature of pop music inherently encourages its listeners to
consume more, because consumption will make them happy.334 As Fredric
Jameson put it, "the commodity is its own ideology: the practices of
consumption and consumerism, on that view, themselves are enough to
reproduce and legitimate the system, no matter what 'ideology' you
happen to be committed to. '335 Hal Foster argued that even devising
alternative meanings for commodities simply furthers consumerism,
because consumers value the appearance of choice and difference.336
Recoding the Beatles as hip-hop music, for example, only broadens their
considerable commercial appeal (and thus their cultural influence). Hip-
hop artist KRS-One has said: "Rap music is something we do, but hip-hop
is something you live., 337 For most people, however, both rap and hip-hop
(as well as rock, jazz, and classical music) are primarily things they buy.
The means, like the content, of sampling can also implicate both
autonomy and domination. Like commercial pop hits, the very technology
of digital sampling consists of commercial commodities (hardware and
software). Moreover, sampling is not just a method of individual
expression through recoding, but also the manner by which much
commercial pop music is produced. Digital sampling became a relatively
affordable and user-friendly "democratic" technology only after it
transformed from a tool for innovative (and elite) cultural practice into a
common method of producing commercial music. A similar analysis may
apply to technology more generally: the forces that make technological
advances affordable and accessible are the same forces that transform them
from subversive innovations into commonplace commodities.
The foregoing argument is not meant to suggest that recoding is
necessarily less creative than reiterative. It is meant only to emphasize that
it can both create new meanings and promulgate the ideas of the culture
industries-and thus simultaneously advance and retard semiotic
333 When asked by a copyright owner's lawyer why he did not create original characters and
scenarios, one fan fiction author replied that "an original work would not have the kind of community
fan fiction automatically creates between reader and writer." Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions:
Copyright, Fan Fiction, anda New Common Law, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651,654 (1997).
334 Cf Ben Watson, Decoding Society Versus the Popsicle Academy: On the Value of Being
Unpopular, in LIVING THROUGH POP 79, 86 (Andrew Blake ed., 1999) (arguing that positive record
reviews "are in effect calls to earn money: to work harder").
335 Fredric Jameson, Architecture and the Critique ofIdeology, in 2 THE IDEOLOGIES OF THEORY:
ESSAYS, 1971-1986 35, 54 (1988) (attributing the phrase "the commodity is its own ideology" to
Theodor Adomo).
336 FOSTER, supra note 200, at 171.
... KRS-ONE, Hip-Hop Knowledge, on THE SNEAK ATTACK (Koch Records 2001).
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democracy. Intellectual property theorists posit hip-hop, and particularly
its use of sampling, as an ideal example of an oppositional practice-one
that is free and genuine-in contrast to conformist, manufactured
commercial culture. As Stuart Hall argues, however, "there is no whole,
authentic, autonomous 'popular culture' which lies outside the field of
force of the relations of cultural power and domination. 33 s He went on to
conclude, "[t]he danger arises because we tend to think of cultural forms as
whole and coherent: either wholly corrupt or wholly authentic. 339
Cultural practice is internally conflicted; it embodies a constant "dialectic
of cultural struggle" between domination by the culture industries and
resistance by the mass audience.340
"Free culture" commentators take an extreme opposite view, and
consider commercial music, television, movies, and the like to be "our
culture. 341  In some very important senses they are "ours." We, as
audience members, make some contribution to making their meanings.
Furthermore, for better or worse, they provide many (if not most) of the
shared aesthetic experiences and ideas that help constitute us as individuals
and communities. But they are also commodities like fast food, sneakers,
or appliances, which are produced by multinational corporations and
marketed to us primarily to generate corporate profits. It is true that we
use copyrighted material, such as musical recordings, books, and TV to
realize and define ourselves.342 However, that argument only tells us that
intellectual property has a significant cultural influence; it does not begin
to address whether that influence is positive. Nor does it explain why our
consumption of intellectual property should be subsidized when so many
other things with comparable influence are not, such as homes, clothing, or
automobiles.
Richard Stallman, one of the originators of the noncommercial GNU
operating system, argued for software that is "free" in the sense that "it
respects the users' essential freedoms: the freedom to run it, to study and
change it, and to redistribute copies with or without changes." According
to Stallman, "This is a matter of freedom, not price, so think of 'free
speech,' not 'free beer.' ' 343 Lawrence Lessig maintains that his vision of
"free culture" is also more like "free speech" than "free beer. ''314  But
338 Hall, supra note 25, at 232-33.
3 3 91 d. at 33.
341 See id. at 233-34.
341 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 9 (quoting, with approval, the Apple advertising slogan, "Rip, Mix,
Burn ..... After all, it's your music").
342 See Aoki, supra note 202, at 837-38.
343 Richard Stallman, Why Open Source Misses the Point of Free Software, GNU OPERATING
SYSTEM, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/open-source-misses-the-point.html.
344 LESSIG, supra note 6, at xiv (citing RICHARD STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETIES 57
(2002)).
20111 REMIfX WITHOUT ROMANCE 473
CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW
although reducing intellectual property protections would facilitate
expression in some ways, it would do so in large part by reducing the
prices of commodities like music and movies. Free culture is like free beer
in this sense. Giving away some beer for free transfers wealth to drinkers
in the short run, but, in the long run, it may increase the demand for beer to
the benefit of sellers and at the expense of drinkers (and of society as a
whole). Similarly, free culture involves subsidizing commodities for the
short-term benefit of individuals as consumers, but it may act in the longer
term as a transfer of both cultural power and wealth to sellers at the
expense of the audience and of society generally. Thus, a legal regime that
limits consumption through prices may in fact be salutary.345
Because media culture is a product we consume rather than make (at
least not entirely), it is not entirely "our" culture. The problem is not an
aesthetic one: many commercial cultural products are of excellent artistic
quality (and much "independently" produced culture is not). Rather, the
problem is one of political power: even as we participate in creating
meaning on some level, we simultaneously delegate some of the meaning-
making function to professionals-that is, we choose to buy (or take)
meaning rather than make it.
Recoding not only fails to completely reject the dominant discourse,
but can also serve to reinforce the dominance of the culture industry's
discourse by adopting and further disseminating it. Indeed, it can even
serve to help market it. Stallman has identified this problem in the
software context. He warns that the "open source" software movement
often fails to serve the goal of "free" software.346 "Open source" refers to
software whose source code is made available so users may tinker with it
and collectively make the software more "powerful and reliable. 347
Although open source is often conflated with free software, Stallman
contrasts the "purely practical values" of open source with free software's
categorical commitment to user freedom. An open source philosophy can
result in users participating in the curtailment of their own freedom, in
direct contradiction of the free software philosophy. For example, an
open-source approach is often used to perfect proprietary software-i.e.,
software that is "un-free" in both senses: the owner both charges money for
it and restricts its dissemination and use.348 Furthermore, open source
participants may help perfect proprietary software that includes "malicious
features" that compromise users' freedom, "such as spying on the users,
345 But see Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV.
809, 813-17 (2010) (criticizing intellectual property law on the grounds that it raises prices and thus
restricts consumption of certain goods).
346 Stallman, supra note 343.
347 Id.
348 Id.
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restricting the users, back doors, and imposed upgrades., 349 According to
Stallman, some open-source advocates have even proposed an open-source
approach to "digital restrictions management" (DRM) software-the very
programs that prevent users from copying software, music and movies.350
Some free-culture advocates demonstrate the kind of contradictions
Stallman identifies in the open-source movement. Even as they espouse
semiotic democracy, they often laud recoding for increasing the revenues
and influence of the culture industries. 35' For example, one commentator
defends sampling on the ground that it can "revive[] the market for an all
but forgotten song or artist." '352 Similarly, some copyright commentators
defend unauthorized file sharing of copyrighted music on the ground that
illegal downloads expose listeners to new music and thus have a positive
marketing effect.353  Like Stallman's open-source tinkerers, these are
examples of users giving industry free product-development and marketing
services that contribute to industry's domination of the user.
As noted above, "Rapper's Delight," originally released in 1979, is
rapped almost entirely over a note-for-note imitation of Chic's "Good
Times," one of that year's most popular songs. "Rapper's Delight" gave
increased exposure to an already dominant cultural trope in pop music at
the time, and further cemented the "Good Times" melody in the public
consciousness. Imani Coppola (who once had a sample-based hit song)
argues that record companies encourage sampling in order to squeeze new
forms of revenue out of songs with proven market power, stating "[i]t's
just a money-making scheme for record companies who are like, [']If they
loved it once before, they're gonna love it again.'
35 4
Similarly, while The Grey Album recoded albums by Jay-Z and the
Beatles, it simultaneously testified to those artists' cultural importance and
provided them with additional exposure. It also made the older music of
the Beatles relevant and appealing to younger audiences. 355 Similarly, the
3 49 
Id.
350 Id. Software and media companies refer to this software as "digital rights management"
software, but many free-software advocates prefer the more ominous mirror-image term "digital
restrictions management" to emphasize that DRM limits freedom of use. See, e.g., What is DRM?
Digital Restrictions Management, DEFECTIVEBYDESIGN.ORG, http://www.defectivebydesign.org/
what is drm (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
351 Similarly, many free-culture advocates believe "fan fiction" furthers semiotic democracy. See,
e.g., Chander & Sunder, supra note 317, at 600; Coombe, supra note 7, at 1877; Tushnet, supra note
341, at 655-58. They do not consider that fan fiction may ill-serve semiotic democracy by "keep[ing]
its consumers excited about the official shows, receptive to other merchandise, and loyal to their
beloved characters." Id. at 669. Paramount Pictures takes a permissive stance toward "Star Trek" fan
fiction for these very reasons. Id.
3 52 
VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 144.
313 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 6, at 68-71.
354 id.
355 See MCLEOD, supra note 57, at 153 (college radio stations added The Grey Album to their
playlists, exposing young college students to the music of The Beatles).
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"mashup" music of Girl Talk (ironically, one of the few sample-based
musicians to expressly invoke fair-use doctrine) derives its appeal
precisely from the familiarity of well-known songs. Gillis himself has
said, "I always wanted to use recognizable elements and play with people's
emotional, nostalgic connections with these songs., 35 6 By deriving its
appeal from the appeal of these existing songs, his work exploits, confirms,
and perpetuates their cultural influence.
Certain sample-based recordings, including The Grey Album, present
the tension between autonomy and domination even more starkly in that
they not only give exposure to established music, but also directly act out
the promotional strategy of the culture industry. While the sampling of the
Beatles' music was unauthorized, Jay-Z himself freely provided the vocal
tracks: when he released The Black Album in 2003, Jay-Z (and his record
company) also released The Black Album: Acappella (sic) a vocal-only
version of the album, and invited anyone to "remix the sh-t out of it."
357
Releasing a cappella versions and other remix-ready recordings has
become a popular promotional tool, because "the labels making these
records want to make it as easy as possible for deejays to remix their
songs. 358  This accessibility increases plays of the record by nightclub
DJs, which can increase record sales.359  The Grey Album (and other
remixes that use authorized recordings) are sometimes portrayed as
subversive of established artists and record companies, but in fact they are
much more conflicted.
The EMI record label had objected to The Grey Album, but it soon
followed Jay-Z and took the recoding-as-marketing concept to its logical
extreme. Purchasers of Lily Allen's 2008 EMI album, "It's Me, It's You"
received online access to MP3 versions of the album's component tracks.
EMI invited fans to remix the tracks and submit them via a website. EMI
claimed exclusive intellectual property rights in any remixes submitted,
and expressly reserved the right to release them commercially without
compensation to the remixer.36° That is, as part of the album purchase,
consumers were purchasing the opportunity to provide EMI with free labor
to create products that EMI could then sell back to the consumer. It is
difficult to claim to have engaged in "subversion" when the target has not
only consented to, but actually initiated the engagement in order to further
its business at your expense. Indeed, these uses of remixing are very literal
356 Dorian Lynskey, A Little Bit of This, a Little Bit of That, GUARDIAN, Oct. 24,2008, at 5.
357 MCLEOD, supra note 57, at 153.
358 Eric Gwinn, A Little of This, a Sample of That-Mashups are Do-it-Yourself CHI. TRIB., Oct.
13, 2005, (At Play) at 13.
359 Id.
360 The terms and conditions are available on EMI's Lily Allen website. Lily Remix: Terms and
Conditions, LILLYALLENMUSIC.COM, http://www.lilyallenmusic.com/lily/remix/terms (last visited
Nov. 9, 2011).
[Vol. 44:415
]REMYX WITHOUT ROMANCE
examples of Hal Foster's admonishment that "to manipulate [an object's]
differences hardly constitutes resistance, as is commonly believed: it
simply means you are a good player, a good consumer.",36
1
Of course, not every form of activity has to advance semiotic
democracy. In moderation, the pleasures of watching television, writing
fan fiction, or remixing a hit pop song may outweigh their marginal
negative social effects. But in this way they are merely guilty pleasures,
more like eating junk food, drinking beer, or driving a big car, and less like
meaningful expressive or political activities worthy of special legal
concern. Academic commentators protest too much when they insist that
practically every use of cultural content--even passive consumption 362 -
constitutes a meaningful exercise in cultural participation.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the debate over who
controls the products of the culture industry is a distraction from a deeper
question-to what extent do such products control us? One commentator
has argued that copyright's prohibitions on unauthorized derivative works
violate the First Amendment because they restrict "freedom of
imagination. ' '363  But one's imagination might also be shackled by
dependence on commercial tropes-and restrictive intellectual property
laws might actually break those bonds. Indeed, one might ask whether
semiotic democracy is better served by encouraging the public to critique
popular culture or by encouraging them to ignore it and fashion
alternatives to it. A logical, if politically unrealistic, approach to this
problem would be to fund arts education through a tax on media
consumption, in much the same way some public-health programs are
funded through taxes on cigarettes.
IV. CONCLUSION: LAW, MARKETS, AND LIBERALISM
The new "free culture" orthodoxy in copyright theory places too much
faith in law's ability to restrict and to empower. This may have something
to do with the foundational metaphor of "intellectual property:" copyright
361 FOSTER, supra note 200, at 171.
362 Many commentators argue that even relatively passive uses, such as the unauthorized file
sharing of copyrighted music, constitute cultural participation that deserves protection from copyright
infringement actions. But they simultaneously argue that these passive uses should be protected
because they benefit the media industry, and they seem oblivious to the tension between these two
kinds of arguments. See LESSIG, supra note 6, at 70-74 (arguing that file sharing has numerous
benefits to the record industry including exposing fans to new music); MCLEOD, supra note 57, at 296-
303 (discussing the lack of statistical connections between illegal file sharing and decreases in record
sales); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 179-82 (positing that music file sharing enables fans to
become exposed to new bands, which benefits the music industry).
363 Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 4
(2002).
364 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 30461.6 (West Supp. 2011).
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and the like are seen as "property" law-a system of entitlements imposed
upon individuals, either by "nature" or by the state. Conversely, in the
theory of corporate and business law, business entities and related legal
rights are commonly described under the rubric of "contracts"-rights
created by the consent of the parties. Thus, the influence of law and other
rules tends to be overstated in the intellectual property context and
understated in the business law context, while the influence of private
solutions or "contract" tends to be understated in intellectual property
scholarship and overstated in business law scholarship.
Intellectual property scholars exaggerate copyright doctrine's ability to
restrict artistic and business practice. Academic commentary on Grand
Upright and other law related to sampling assumes that individuals cannot
bargain around legal entitlements or make decisions about cultural
participation on grounds other than immediate legal and financial cost. But
the history of sampling suggests both these assumptions are untrue.
Sample clearance requirements did not spell the end of musical recoding;
indeed, sampling evolved under such requirements. Hip-hop artists and
labels acknowledged the cost of appropriation-and worked out payment
practices-long before any courts ordered them to do so. Furthermore,
there is no reason to assume that the cost of licensing was, or is, the
determinative factor in hip-hop's recoding practices. Artistic and
commercial factors were undoubtedly also at work.
Legal scholars also tend to overstate the ability of copyright reform to
equalize the distribution of semiotic power in society. They follow the
liberal assumption that power imbalances can be corrected by market
forces as long as legal background rules are formally equal. Under this
view, if the law puts everyone on formally equal footing, "private" forces
(such as the concentrated media industry) are by definition unable to
restrict individual freedom, because "market" forces inevitably reach free
and fair outcomes. Thus, formally equal opportunities to participate in
culture (such as by recoding) are sufficient to advance semiotic democracy.
This model downplays the possibility that existing disparities in cultural
influence and financial resources curtail the ability of the disempowered to
take advantage of formally equal opportunities, and that formal equality in
a context of substantive inequality can even increase opportunities for the
powerful to exploit the disempowered. Furthermore, even if the
disempowered exercise a legal entitlement to recode, that exercise can
simultaneously embody both resistance and capitulation to the dominance
of commercial culture.
An intellectual property regime that encourages cultural appropriation
can have both positive and negative effects on semiotic democracy-
whether it is formally equal, or whether it asymmetrically empowers the
semiotically weak to appropriate. The effects are so subtle and speculative
that it is probably futile to attempt to calculate the net effect of an
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appropriation-rights regime. Thus the argument that recoding advances
semiotic democracy is not necessarily wrong, but it cannot really be proven
to be right or wrong.
Intellectual property theorists overstate individual autonomy with
respect to acts of cultural appropriation, but understate the autonomy of the
individual in the face of intellectual property law. This apparent
inconsistency may be reconciled in light of liberal-individualist belief that
the state poses a special threat to liberty and that non-state actors have only
limited ability to do SO. 365  So although they identify the concentrated
culture industry as a threat to semiotic democracy, they believe this
imbalance is the product of legal doctrine (i.e., copyright law) repressing
the individual. Thus they believe it can be corrected by formally equal
legal entitlements and free markets. Despite its appropriation of radical
terminology, the "free culture" project is, in fact, a fundamentally liberal-
capitalist one.
161 See Amitai Etzioni, Law in Civil Society, Good Society, and the Prescriptive State, 75 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 355, 356 (2000).
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